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The greatest natural enemy of the people of
the United States has been the floods of the Mississippi
River. This vast fertile valley constitutes the great-
est garden spot of the world. From early times this
valuable land has lured men by its tremendous potentiali-
ties for which they have been willing to fight almost
insurmountable difficulties.
For many years the riparian owners carried on
their struggle to conquer this region, unaided by the
government. Then parishes, counties ana states began
their fight.
Finally it became evident that this colossal system
of internal improvement was a problem for the Federal
Government.
This program of Federal Control has expanded until
now it has assumed practically all the responsibility.
It is my purpose to trace the development of the
ever increasing need of Federal Control of the Miss-
issippi River and to point out the great economic losses
incurred by the lack and delay of such control.
Many theories have been advanced, many controversies
have occurred. I mention the outstanding ones as they
have affected the development of the program of Federal
Control
..
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Chapter I
Historical Sketch of Early Beginnings of Flood
Control of the Mississippi
.
1Development of Federal Flood Control
of the Mississippi River
Historical Sketch of Early Beginnings of Flood
Control of the Mississippi
The exact date of the beginning of national interest
in the control of the Mississippi River has not been estab-
lished. History tells us that the flood problem extended
back to the native Indians of the lower valley. An early
accout of De Soto’s expedition tells us that the great in-
undations in the Mississippi Valley forced the Indians to
use only the highest ground on which to build their homes.
In places where no high ground co ild be found the floods
forced them to build huge earthen mounds with flat tops on
which they could live during the flood season. Several of
these mounds are in existence today in the delta region.
Many of them have connecting elevated runways, apparently
for the purpose of communication during floods. De Soto’s
men gave an interesting account about an Indian chief’s
house on one of these gigantic mounds. This house was sur-
rounded by palisades and a village of huts encircled the
1
foot of the mound.
1 John B. McMaster—History of People of United States, p. 145

Photograph from Acme News Pictures
PROM THE AIR THIS MOUND POORS PIKE A GIANT TURTPE
In flood times, it is believed, the early Indians used such mounds as places of refuge. For
decades past, whites and their livestock have fled to them during high water. This mound is
near Greenville, Mississippi.
I’The Great Mississippi Flood of 1957”
The National Geographic Sept. 1927—p. 261

2The first white men learned from the natives that
floods made yearly appearances which proved very destructive
From the very birth of our nation the disposition of the
waters of the Mississippi Valley furnished one of the diffi-
cult problems. Each year the river took heavy tolls while
the settlers prepared plans for defense against inundations.
France, Spain, England, and the United States figured
prominently in the control of this important stream, which
all seemed to recognize would play a most important part
in the history of the entire continent and incidentally the
world .
The settlers from Europe knew a better way to control
the river than to build mounds. They knew the value of
levees. The Pharoahs built levees along the Nile. The
Europeans had built levees along the Po before 1300 A. D.
Holland made extensive use of levees. The Danube, Rhine,
Rhone, and Volga rivers had levees for protection against
1
floods before 1700 A. D. Thus the Europeans had the advan-
tages of experience in flood control before coming to America.
The disposition of the lower Mississippi valley fur-
nished one of the difficult problems during the negotiations
at Paris (1783) in making the treaty that recognized the
independence of the United States. The question of the
control of the Mississippi, however, was not settled at
Paris .
England, Spain, and France continued to struggle over
IB. G. Humphreys’ Floods and Levees of the Mississippi River
p . 16

3
their interests in the valley. Intrigues of these nations
among the inhabitants of the Western frontier especially
in Kentucky and Tennessee, and the Indians of the valley,
gave evidence that these nations were willing to take
great risks to secure a foothold there. The attitude of
these western settlers gave rise to a very critical situ-
ation in the early development of the United States. The
Western settlers threatened to withdraw from the Union and
ally themselves with whatever nation was in control of this
important waterway, so essential did they consider the
navigation of the Mississippi to their development and
welfare. This dispute extended over a period of years.
The Pickney treaty of 1795 temporarily settled the right
of deposit at New Orleans. The attitude of the people of
the United States showed convincing evidence of a national
interest in the valley far beyond the question of naviga-
tion toward the transfer of Louisiana from Spain to France
1
in 1800.
Thomas Jefferson wrote to James Madison in May 1801
that the transfer of Louisiana to France would prove "very
p
ominous to us." In his message to Congress in 1802 Jeffer-
son stated that the transfer of Louisiana by the Ssn Ildefonso
Treaty seriously affected the interests of the United States.
Meanwhile the people of the United States talked and
1 Frederic Ogg’s Opening of Mississippi, p. 423
2 Henry S. Randall’s Life of Thomas Jefferson, Vol. Ill p. 6
3 Ibid
'.
„
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4wrote much about the natural right of the Free Navigation
of the Mississippi. They repeatedly pointed out the
"grave dangers of permitting a European nation to estab-
1
lish a strong colony in the lower valley"
.
This interest of the people of the United States be-
came so tense that Jefferson determined to secure control
of at least the east bank of the river. When the opportun-
ity presented itself Jefferson committed an act "beyond the
Constitution" by purchasing the whole of the Louisiana
Territory. That Jefferson should take such a step, furnishes
proof that the people of the United States were seriously
concerned in the control of the Mississippi.
The purchase of Louisiana indicated an interest in a
condition out of which would grow a favorable attitude toward
Flood Control. The Federal Government appeared to take an
interest in the problem of floods from the date of the
Louisiana purchase.
From the early settlement of Louisiana the people of
the lower valley gave much time, effort and money in an
attempt to solve the problems of the great inundations.
Bienville selected the site for New Orleans because
the land there was above water when he arrived, while all
the surrounding territory was inundated by the Mississippi
2
River. This New Orleans settlement suffered heavily from
1 John B. McMaster’s History of People of United States, p. 803
2 Rightor’s Standard History of New Orleans, p. 171
s.
5
.
:
1
.
_
5annual spring floods. While the other settlements lower
1
than New Orleans were ’’almost destroyed by mighty floods”.
The settlers at New Orleans began the construction of
levees on the banks of the Mississippi in 1717. nTen years
later. Governor Perrier announced proudly that New Orleans
had a levee a mile iong and eight feet wide, that within
another year the embankment would be extended above and be-
low the city for a total distance of eighteen miles.”
In 1812, when Louisiana became a state, the levees ex-
tended 155 miles on the east bank and 185 miles on the west
bank of the Mississippi. The cost of these 840 miles of
levees has been estimated at $>6, 000, 000.
One of the conditions of the grants by which the early
settlers received the land from the King of France, obliged
the planters to build levees.
”In 1745 the Governor of the territory promulgated
an ordinance that required the inhabitants to complete their
portions of the levees by January 1, 1744 or forfeit their
4
grants as penalties.” Such facts give proof that a govern-
mental interest existed in the protection of the lower valley
of the Mississippi long before Louisiana became a state.
The national interest, however, during the first half of the
1 Lyon Saxon’s Father Mississippi, p. 121
2 Humphrey and Abbott’s Hydraulics of Mississippi River, p. 150
5 Tompkin’s Riparian Lands of the Mississippi River, p. 22
4 Lyon Saxon’s Father Mississippi, p. 159
.
6nineteenth century, was directed to the improvement of
navigation, rather than flood control. The demands of
the early settlers of the lower Mississippi were not
directed toward improved navigation because the type of
boats used at that date did not need an improved river.
These early settlers were interested in free navigation.
The coming of the steamboat and its development created
a demand for the improvement cf navigation, especially
on the Mississippi River.
In 1820 Congress appropriated $5,000 for a survey
of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers for the purpose of
determining the most practicable way of improving naviga-
tion. No attention was given for flood protection. Two
young army engineers, S. Bernard and Joseph G. Totten were
1
chosen to make the survey.
’’These engineers concluded that the only way to pre-
vent the accumulation of snags was to construct dykes to
O
prevent the lateral currents.” They reported that the
levees on the lower river served both as protective works
against floods and as a preventive against lateral currents.
These engineers believed that while the levees had been built
as protection against floods, they also served to improve
the navigation. Thus while navigation improvement re-
mained the chief consideration of those interested in the
welfare of the Mississippi Valley, flood control became of
1 17th Congress--House Doc. No. 55, 2nd Sess. 1825, p. 5
2 House Report No. 500, pt. 2, 65rd Cong. 2nd Sess., p. 21
*.
.
7increasing interest. Appeals were made before Congressional
Committees in 1827. The Federal Government began to do some
work in the improvement of the river through members of the
Corps of Engineers. In 1851 this committee urged the
Federal Government to continue the development of the river
commerce. ^ Again in 1845 the Senate Committee of Congress
urged improvement of the river by Federal Government. In
1846 John C. Calhoun introduced a bill in the Senate for the
2
improvement of the Mississippi. As late as 1855 the Senate
engaged in a lengthy debate concerning improvement of the
Mississippi without mentioning Flood Control. These com-
plaints came chiefly from merchants and owners of boats.
This powerful group of business men demanded river improve-
ment in aid of navigation. They gave graphic accounts of
the exceedingly heavy losses from wrecks of river boats due
to the boats striking snags.
The land owners said little. Every movement for im-
proving navigation meant the construction of more levees,
which would protect their lands from inundation.
In 1845 a Convention of Southern and Western States
assembled at Memphis for the purpose of considering means
5
of the entire section. John C. Calhoun presided over this
important meeting. He pleaded for the control of the Miss-
1 Senate Document No. 72, 21st Cong. 2nd Sess. 1851, p. 7
2 Cong. Globe, 29th Cong., 1st Sess., 1846, p. 1028
5 House Report No. 500, pt. 2, 65rd Cong. 2nd Sess., p. 12
..
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8issippi floods by the Federal Government. He took particular
caution to say that flood control was not internal improve-
1
ment
.
Henry Clay proposed a resolution directing the Secretary
of the Treasury to have "an estimate made of the probable
expense of constructing a levee on the public land on the
western bank of the Mississippi and the southern bank of
the Red River; the probable effects upon the health and
prosperity of the country and the probable quantity of
g
public land that might be reclaimed by such works.” The
increased valuation of the lands that could be drained and
reclaimed furnished great inducement to those who favored
internal improvements for voting for this resolution.
In 1848 Abraham Lincoln argued in favor of the Federal
Control of the Mississippi. ^ In 1855 considerable discussion
took place in the senate over another bill to improve the
Mississippi. Senator Robert Toombs made a very strong argu-
4
ment against internal improvements by the Federal Government.
All this agitation helped to create favorable public senti-
ment for the project.
Meanwhile the movement for flood control by the Federal
Government developed. Through the efforts of the individual
riparian proprietor, through parishes, through counties, the
1 Flood Control Hearings 1916, p. 12
2 House Document No. 11, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 1835, p. 3
3 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1916, p. 17
4 Cong. Globe, 54th Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 3, 1855, p. 1908
..Cl ''I
'• i t
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9levees grew in length and strength. As various states in
the lower valley came into the Union they enacted statutes
for regulation and supervision of levee building.
The planters in the valley were enabled by slave-labor
to build most of the levees at the least possible cost.
Most of the work could be done at odd times and during
seasons when there was little farm work.
Counties and parishes went so far as to make appropri-
ations for levees, as it became apparent that the riparian
owners could not cope with the task. This aid was too small
to amount to much.
Conventions had met on several occasions in the valley
states for the purpose of promoting the interests of the
Mississippi Valley Flood Control. These conventions were
composed of leading men such as Abraham Lincoln, Thomas H.
2
Benton, John C. Calhoun, and Horace Greeley. ' Daniel Webster
predicted in 1850 that "ere long the strength of America
g
will be in the Valley of the Mississippi."
Congress required that all such problems be investi-
gated, but little came of such investigations except an
increase of public interest in flood control.
As early as 1845, John C. Calhoun suggested the
assigning of certain public lands to the states concerned
4
to be used for the purpose of flood protection.
1 Flood Control—Commercial Document No. 5, House Com., p. 94
2 House Report, No. 500, pt. 2, 6Srd Cong. 2nd Sess., 1914, p. 22
5 Manufacturers Record, Vol. 91, June 2 , 1927, p. 69
4 B. G. Humphrey’s Floods and Levees of Mississippi River, p. 29
..
.
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The sentiment in behalf of flood control by the Fed-
eral Government grew very rapidly from 1840-1860. A series
of bad floods made it evident that the problem was too
large for the planters. Two severe floods in 1849 and
1850 caused serious damage and created much complaint from
the delta people. The problem had gone beyond the capacity
of the parishes and counties, it seemed too great for even
State governments. The inadequacy of the existing levees
convinced a large number of Congress that the time had come
when the Federal Government should give some aid to the
people of the Mississippi Delta.
(
—
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First Aid from Federal Government
The first aid from the Federal Government for Flood
Control on the Mississippi River came in 1849 and 1850.
The first aid applied only to Louisiana. The second to
several states. By these acts Congress granted to the
several states the swamp and overflowed lands within their
borders unfit for cultivation and provided that the proceeds
from the sale of the lands must be spent for drainage and
flood protection. The chief cause for these donations was
flood control, although drainage and reclamation were im-
portant considerations. 1
Louisiana received the largest share with Arkansas
next. Several states that had no serious flood problems
received donations of large acreages. Illinois, Minnesota,
and Wisconsin were among the large beneficiaries, each re-
ceived more than Mississippi. The swamp and overflowed
land acts of 1849 and 1850 could not be considered strictly
as flood-control legislation, yet they did represent the
2
beginning of Federal aid for Flood Control.
In 1850 Congress passed another act which "directed
a topographical and hydrographical survey of the delta of
1 F.ightor’s Standard History of Hew Orleans, p. 173
2 Flood Control—House Committee Bill 8219, p. 15
V
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the Mississippi River with such investigation as might
lead to determine the most practical plan for securing it
from inundation.” ^ Congress then appropriated a sum of
$50,000 to carry out the provisions of this act. Two
years later this appropriation was increased by another
#50,000.
These two appropriations made possible two surveys
and two reports. ”The report made by A. A. Humphreys
and H. S. Abbott, engineers of the United States army
under the title of the Physics and Hydraulics of the Miss-
issippi River still remains one of the most weighty author-
£
ities on any of the Mississippi River Problems.” . The
second report which was less scholarly than that of
Humphreys and Abbott, resulted from a survey of Charles
Ellet. The Ellet report preceded the other by ten years.
It was the result of the first study by the Federal
government for the purpose of determining how to control
•X
or to prevent destructive floods on the Mississippi River.
In this report Ellet concluded that the control of the
Mississippi floods was the duty of the Federal Government.
Prior to 1849 the Federal Government had not recog-
nized in any material way the responsibility that rested
1 1922 House Committee Hearings on Flood Control, p. 180
2 Ibid
5 Senate Executive Document No. 20, S2nd Cong. 1852, p. 2
. U.
c
.
.
'
.
upon it to aid the local governments and individual
property owners in control of floods. In this report
Mr. Ellet contended that "fairness dictated that the
first Congressional aid should be extended to the area
1
from the Red River to the Gulf of Mexico." He further
stated that increased cultivation and improved drainage
in the upper valley areas had caused the increased flood
heights. "The process by which the country above is re-
2
lievea is that by which the country below is ruined."
Mr. Ellet further recommended that Congress aid in
building levees and that it should also investigate the
advisability of constructing reservoirs and diversion
channels .
Mr. Humphreys began the work with Mr. Ellet but he
was obliged to return North to regain his health. The
report of Humphreys and Abbott which came in 1361 was the
result of ten years of research and profound study.
Every phs.se of the problem was covered in a most scientific
manner. Meanwhile the states of the lower Mississippi
Valley had showed increased interests in the problem. Many
problems arose in which the necessary protective works
overlapped county or parish lines. Protective works had to
be constructed in some places for the protection of areas
1 Senate Executive Document No. 20, p. 98
2 House Committee on Flood Control—70th Congress—Doc. No.
p. 107
'I-
-
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in other counties or parishes. The states were forced to
revise their laws to make them more uniform and to meet
more effectively the problems arising in the solution of
so great a problem. The states created Levee Districts
and Levee Boards. The first Levee Board was created al-
most immediately after the swamp and overflowed land act
of 1850.
The acts of Congress in 1849, 1850 and 1852 represent-
ed the first actual beginning of Federal Control. This
beginning of Federal Control may be attributed to the im-
portance of President Taylor's attitude toward advancing
the interests of this great movement. President Taylor
came from Louisiana where he owned a large plantation which
had suffered from floods. "His knowledge of actual condi-
tions gave him an insight to the problem that must have
had much influence on his ideas concerning it." ^
By 1858 the Mississippi had levees for a total distance
of two thousand miles along the two banks. The average
height had reached from eight to ten feet, while the width
at the base was from fifty to seventy feet. The people of
the lower Mississippi had spent more than |40,000,000 in
building that levee line. *
1 Congressional Record—45th Congress, 3rd Sess. 1879, p. 503
2 Congressional Record—43rd Congress
—
part 5, p. 4654
.
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Louisiana had most of the levees, as she had spent
more than all other states together.
The people of the delta had come to feel quite
secure by 1858 behind their extensive line of defense.
But in the fall of 1858 and the winter and spring’ of
1859 occurred the worst flood they had ever known in the
history of the Mississippi Valley. This great inundation
tore through the levees by numerous crevasses and devastated
1
most of the delta area.
This general destruction of the levee system at the
time when the people expected it to be powerful enough to
cope with any flood, gave conclusive evidence that the
flood control works must be built higher and stronger, that
the problem was too great for them to cope with. The local
governments naturally turned to the Federal Government with
this great problem.
1 American Railway Engineering Association Vcl. 29, p. 11
'. . ^
Chapter IX
Creation
of the
Mississippi River Commission

16
Creation
of the
Mississippi fiver Commission
The lower valley states of the Mississippi River
enjoyed prosperity during the years 1650 to 1857. This
period of prosperity resulted largely from the increased
returns from the cotton crops, the general prosperity of
1
the section and the land acts of 1849 and 1850. Because
of this prosperity the planters along the river used their
increased funds for the further protection from floods.
The levees were more rapidly extended than in any
former period. The embankments were constructed very
rapidly and often very poorly. No opportunity for test-
ing this poorly constructed work was given until the great
flood in the spring of 1859. The people believed that the
levees would offer ample protection. Great was their dis-
appointment when the flood waters poured upon them through
twenty-five miles of crevasses and left the people of the
delta in an impoverished condition. These victims would
not be defeated and courageously began the great and
burdensome task all over again with more determination
than ever to continue to fight this great enemy.
1 Floods and Levees of the Mississippi River--Humphreys, p. 22

So impoverished were the people that they began to
make urgent appeals for Federal Aid. f1By 1661 their
case appeared to be in a good position before the select
committees of the House and the Senate which had been
1
appointed to consider the problem.” All chances of
success collapsed when the great Civil War turned the
people of this nation to that great catastrophe. This
calamity struck the delta section a staggering blow
which stopped all work of rebuilding and extending levees.
Naturally the riparian owners and their slaves turned
their efforts to the service of their states.
Levees must have constant care to keep them from
rapid deterioration. The war forced the land owners to
abandon them. Four years of neglect caused serious loss
to the levees from natural causes. Other destructive
forces added to their deterioration. Both armies destroyed
the levees whenever there appeared to be any military ad-
vantage to do so. The delta people themselves found it
necessary to destroy their own construction works, which
had cost them enormously in labor, capital and former losses.
This must be done for the defense of their homes. The
Union army destroyed the great Yazoo and Huspuckena levees
2
in an effort to reach Vicksburg from the rear. These levees
1 Rand-McNally Bankers' Monthly, Feb. 1S15, Vol. 52, p. 15
2 Congressional Record—70th
—
part 6
,
1st Sess. 1928, p. 4247
.ic .
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were the finest in the delta. The Yazoo Pass embankment
was thirty-eight feet high, and had been constructed at
an enormous cost to the people who erected it.
To add to their distress there occurred during the
Civil War and the period of reconstruction a series of
exceptional floods, the most remarkable ever recorded in
our history. Great floods came in 1858, 1859, 1882, 1865
1
1867, 1874 and 1882. Each flood founc every levee in
worse condition than the previous one, each flood there-
fore wrought greater havoc than the preceding one. Cre-
vasse after crevasse occurred and mile after mile of levees
fell into the river with caving banks. By 1378 hundreds
of miles of the main line had disappeared or had been
2
abandoned. The value of the levees for defense against
floods in 1878 was but a small fraction of their value
for that purpose in 1858. Then for "two decades their
conditions grew worse and worse until great floods went
3
through and over them without restraint."
Destruction, and ravages of war and floods hsd
wrought havoc with the levees, yet as soon as the war
ceased, the delta people bravely began to repair and re-
build them. This task was an extremely difficult one.
The economic disaster could hardly be estimated. Farm
1 Floods in Lower Mississippi Valley— I. M. Cline, p. 5
2 House Committee- -Flood Control--70th Cong.
—
Comm. Doc. 1
p. 21
3 Mississippi River Improvement—R. S. Taylor, pt. 1, p. 6
—
19
lands in Arkansas, Louisiana and Mississippi were valued
at almost four times as much in 1860 as they were in
1870. ^ Farm lands had to bear most of the burden cf re-
placing the levees. ’’The people of the delta in an effort
to protect themselves against floods taxed a large part
of their lands to such a degree that they passed out of
their possession and back into the possession of the
States where they yielded no revenue.”
By 1670 more than half of the lands of the fertile
Yazoo Basin which in 1861 had been valued at $100 per
acre for woodlands, had been forfeited by the owners to
the States because the taxes could not be paid . ^ This
burden was too great for those who retained their lands
to bear. Conventions were called by the owners in many
localities to discuss this great problem in their efforts
to devise a solution; if possible. ’’They seriously con-
sidered the advisability of abandoning the whole fight
and permitting the river to run. at will over their former
4
productive fields.” It appeared they would be compelled
to surrender, either to the river on the one hand or to
dire poverty on the other. They had never known the time
when an enemy had not compelled them to fight for their
1 63rd Congress—House Report No. 300, part 2, 2nd Sess. p. IS
2 Floods and Levees of the Mississippi River-B. G. Humphreys,
p . 19
3 Ibid—
2
4 House Committee Hearings—Flood Control 1916, p. 12
'u
. ..
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lives, homes, and property. Yet, they were reluctant
to leave what had been their homes and surrender to their
great economic disaster.
To add to their plight of distress the Federal
Government added a. severe blow to the people of the lower
Mississippi. Congress levied a tax of three cents per
pound on cotton during the years 1868, 1867 and 1868.
At this inopportune time such a tax was unbearable for
the delta people. Funds for levee construction had to
come largely from the cotton lands. At the request of
the Secretary of the Treasury, Congress repealed the tax.
The Mississippi Commission
Flood protective works had been constructed by
poorly managed organizations. On the very eve of the
outbreak of the war, legislative steps had been taken
for the organization of Levee Boards. As soon as the
war ceased the people developed the organization of
these boards to renew their fight.
The State of Louisiana granted a charter to the
Louisiana Levee Company and then contracted with that
company to build and repair levees. "The lav/ provided
for the location of all levees by a Commission of Three
IB. G. Humphreys—Floods and Levees of Mississippi River, p. 2Z
..
.
’
Engineers. One member of this Commission was to be
selected by Louisiana and one was to be detailed from
the Corps of Engineers of the United States army by
the President of the United States. The third was an
employee of the corporation. That appears to have been
the first official participation of a representative of
the Federal Government in the actual Construction of
1
Flood Control Works.”
Fortunately the movement for federal Government
participation in flood control had developed rapidly
during the decade prior to the war. The war had been
over only a short time when the Secretary of War, Edwin
M. Stanton, showed an active interest in repairing and
2
rebuilding the levees.
On December 1, 1665, Mr. Stanton directed General
A. A. Humphreys to investigate and report on the re-
pairs to the levees necessary to prevent great injury
to the agriculture in the delta. On June 11, 1866
Congress directed Chief of Engineers to report and
furnish an estimate of the amount of money that would
be required to repair the breaks. This report was made
by General Humphreys in 1866. ° General Humphreys re-
1 Federal Program of Flood Control on the Mississippi
—
A. D. Frank, p. 35
2 Riparian Lands of Mississippi River—Tompkins, p. 212
3 Senate Executive Document No. 8—40th Congress, 1st
Sess. 1866 Program of Flood Control, A. D. Frank, p. 34
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ported that ”he found many miles of levee line missing
and many more miles in such condition that repairing
them would be practically rebuilding of the levees.”
He strongly urged the necessity of aid by the Federal
Government, by stating, ”the proper establishment of
levees requires some authority entirely beyond the in-
13
fluence of local interests.”
President Johnson, in his second annual message
urged Congress to pass legislation which seemed necessary
for the preservation of the levees of the Mississippi
River. He further stated that the maintenance of strong
barriers against the floods on the Mississippi River
was of the greatest national importance to both produc-
tion and commerce. He put the emphasis upon the flood
control phase of the problem, yet he further emphasized
the importance of removing ”all obstructions to free
5
and safe navigation” of the Mississippi.
Much activity took place in both houses of Congress
during the three years following the war. On July 2
,
1836 the Senate Select Committee reported that it be-
lieved that the Federal Government would have to aid in
rebuilding the levees in order to' prevent serious damage
4
to the delta. The Senate Committee on Finance reported
1 Senate Executive Doc., No. 8, Cong. 1st Sess. p. 2
2 Ibid, p. 12
3 J. D. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
p. 3652
4 Congressional Record—43rd Congress part 4, 1st Sess. p. 3145
.'
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on March 27, 1867 that it was satisfied of the "consti-
tutional power and expediency and good policy" of grant-
ing aid in the construction of levees along the banks
1
of the lower Mississippi. This Committee reported the
recommendation of the expenditure of $3,000,000 for the
2
construction of levees.
The House of Representatives on July 22, 1868
passed a resolution instructing the Committee on Roads
and Canals to inquire into the property of making the
levees of the Mississippi a national highway or other-
wise so improving them as to protect them at the expense
8
and to the advantage of the public.
Three days later, the Senate resolved to instruct
the Committee on Commerce to make inquiry concerning the
"expediency of taking measures by the General Government
to rebuild the levees upon the lower Mississippi which were
4
destroyed during the late war." A resolution was also
passed to instruct the Committee to report by bill or
otherwise at the next session of Congress.
Meanwhile many bills were introduced into Congress
by those who favored Flood Control. Although many aied,
yet they created much discussion and favorable comment.
The method of financing that received considerable
1 Congressional Record, 43rd Cong. 1st Sess., pt. 4, 1874
p. 3243
2 Ibid.
3 Congressional Globe, 40th Cong. 2nd Sess. 1868, p. 180
4 Congressional Globe, 40th Conp. 2nd Sess., pt. 5, 1868
p. 4335
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attention was to have the Federal Government guarantee
State bonds, the proceeds from which would be used in
1
building levees.
Then followed the gray days. There came a period
of about five years during the reconstruction in which
little interest was shown. Few bills were introduced.
In 1871 Representative L. A. Sheldon of Louisiana intro-
duced a bill proposing to charter a Corporation of Pri-
vate Capital to build a levee from Cape Girardeau,
2
Missouri to Fort Jackson, Louisiana. This corporation
would also build a telegraph line on the levee and a
railway along the side of it. Ownership and management
were to remain with the corporation; the supervision of
both Construction and Maintenance was to be under the
Engineers of the United States Army. The original in-
vestment of the United States under that plan would
have been a subsidy of $16,000 per mile in all a total
3
of $18,000,000.
In 1870 Congress established an agency which has
long ago proved its value as a source of data on floods.
This agency was the United States Weather Bureau.
In 1873 Senator James L. Alcorn of Mississippi
1 Congressional Globe—40th Congress part 5, 1368, p. 1670
2 Ibid—End’ session part 1, p. 823
3 Ibid—2nd session part 1, p. 283
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introduced a bill which provided for an issue of United
States bonds for 136,000,000 to be spent in the con-
struction of levees on the banks of the Mississippi
for the reclamation of twenty million acres.
Following the Civil War the people of the delta
resorted to the frequent use of right of petition in
their efforts to get the question of Flood Control
before Congress. From various sections and organizations
of the South memorials and petitions were frequently
presented before Committees in bulletins and on the
floors of Congress.
In the spring of 1874 a serious flood again caused
severe losses and widespread suffering. During this
flood Congress appropriated $90,000 for the relief of
the sufferers. This was one more step toward Federal
Control. Serious floods always moved Congress to feel
the necessity of an investigation into the causes and
remedies. Immediately following the floods of June
1874 President Grant approved an act creating a com-
mission of engineers "to investigate reclamation of the
alluvial basin of the Mississippi River subject to
1
inundation." This commission was composed of three
engineers from the Corps of Engineers of the United
States Army and two eminent Civil Engineers actively
1 Congressional Record 43rd Congress 1st session part 4, p. 517L
..
engaged in the profession. The President soon appointed
the commission with General G. K. Warren as chairman,
and the sum of $25,000 was appropriated for its use.
The report of the Warren Commission, made in 1875,
showed considerable study of conditions in the delta
and of the problems of floods. It did much to hasten
the trend toward Federal Control of Floods. This re-
port proceeded to give reasons why the Federal Govern-
ment should engage in the- control of the Mississippi
Floods. General Warren estimated that after the flood
of 1874, in some states the gaps in the levees equaled
from one-third to one-half the entire length of the
levees. He further stated that the Southern States
were so impoverished that neither the local riparian
proprietors nor the states could do much toward solving
the problem unaided by the general government. General
Warren 1 s report encouraged members of Congress who
favored Federal Control and stimulated the growth of
public sentiment. During the period of reconstruction
Captain James Eads came into national prominence as an
authority on hydraulics.
During this period there were those who favored
the improvement of navigation on the Mississippi. While
the navigation interests and the flood control interests
' *
-
.
had puite different objects in view, they both favored
levees in the locations. This made their bond the
stronger. Members of Congress had long argued the
right and duty of the Federal Government to build
levees on the Mississippi to improve navigation, but at
the same time denied the right or duty to build the same
levees in the same places to protect against floods.
Other members of Congress took the position that since
levees built for one purpose would serve for the other,
they should not be so particular in defining the exact
1
purpose for which the levees should be built.
The recommendation of the engineers for the con-
struction of levees for improving the river to aid
navigation was very fortunate fcr the delta people.
Those interested in navigation had influence of
their own. This influence caused Congress to appropri-
ate money for the improvement of the river.
In 1878 the rivers and harbors bill provided one
million dollars for aiding navigation of the Mississippi
The money was spent by the Board on the Improvement of
the Mississippi River under the supervision of the Corps
of Engineers of the United States army. The membership
of that board was composed of army engineers who favored
1 Congressional Record--43rd Congress 1st session part 4
p. 5246
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1
levees for improving navigation. In this way, the
engineers of the United States army were actually im-
proving the river by favoring levees for the aid of
navigation. The opinions of the army engineers were
held in high regard by members of Congress.
The creation of the Mississippi River Commission
in 1879 which put the United States definitely into
flood control work, stands as ,T the most important piece
2
of flood control legislation in all of our history."
This act made it the duty of the Commission "to take into
consideration and mature such a plan or plans and estimates
as will correct, permanently locate, and deepen the
channel and protect the banks of the Mississippi River,
improve and give safety and ease to the navigation thereof,
prevent destructive floods and promote and facilitate
commerce, trade, and the postal service." 6
The debate on the bill in Congress not only showed
that the navigation interests dominated but that the flood
control people camouflaged their efforts in behalf of
their plans to use the Commission for the purpose of con-
trolling floods.
Some frankly supported or opposed the bill as a
1 Floods and Levees of the Mississippi River-B. G. Humphreys
2 House Committee on Flood Control—1916, He/ rines p. 8
2 Ibid, p. 8
-
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flood control measure; some paid attention only to the
phase that dealt with navigation; still others like
James A. Garfield, supported the bill and encouraged
the expenditure of money both for flood control and im-
1
provement of navigation.
Those who stressed the navigation phases of the
bill presented arguments to show the great need for
better transportation as a means of lowering freight
rates and breaking monopoly of railroads.
Those who stressed the flood control urged the
national interest in the delta. The administration
forces favored the bill apparently in behalf of both
flood control and navigation. The bill lead to a lengthy
and heated debate. It was charged th? t the Commission
created by the bill "would reflect the opinions of the
Corps of Engineers of the United States army" which
meant that levees would be the only means of flood con-
trol with any chance of adoption. Representative John
II. Peagon of Texas led a successful fight to secure an
amendment that compelled the Commission to consider other
2
means of control. This amendment made it a duty of the
Commission to give due consideration to reservoirs, out-
lets and other means of flood control.
1 Congressional Record 46th Congress 1st session part 2,
p. 2282
2 Ibid—45th Congress 3rd session part 5, p. 74
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these two factors seeking Giiferent one s oy
the same means, combined to pass the act that created
the Mississippi River Commission, an agency that has
carried out the flood control program of the Federal
Government to the present time.
.
Progress of the Mississippi River
Commission—1679—1927
By the creation of the Mississippi River Com-
mission in 1879, Congress officially recognized its
share in the control of the Mississippi floods.
1879 marked the beginning of systematic efforts
on the part of the local governments as well as the
part of the nation.
The people of the delta had made renewed efforts
about 1675 to rebuild their dilapitated levees; but,
they still worked in the old independent and disorgan-
ized way. From the Civil War to 1879 they had spent
1
approximately five million dollars. Because of the
lack of organization they had little to show for their
efforts and expenditures.
Meanwhile, the United States Government had been
spending considerable money on the improvement of the
Mississippi, yet, it had nothing to do with Federal
Control. All Federal funds prior to the creation of
the Mississippi River Commission had been under river
and harbor control and had been spent wholly for channel
and harbor improvement. These two jurisdictions worked
independently of each other.
1 Congressional Record 47th Cong. 1st Sess. pt. 4, p. 5215
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When the Mississippi Biver Commission was created,
the states responded to the Federal legislation by the
32
creation of Levee Boards. The Mississippi Biver Com-
mission and the Levee Boards thus took up the work of a
century of levee building of the most disorganized
1
manner. Levees then existing had been built by the
most crude methods, they had been neglected and wilfully
destroyed during the Civil War, and by a series of floods
which had followed the war thousands of miles of levees
had been practically annihilated.
The organizations had little with which to commence
work. The Mississippi Biver Commission had to establish
2
standards for its work without any accurate data.
The first projects were confined to two small reaches of
river totaling seventy-two miles in length, and wrere
designed to aid- navigation.
The first three years the wrork of the Commission was
limited to repairing the levees. All the needed repairs,
and many miles had been destroyed leaving extensive gaps.
In 1684, the Commission began its policy to strengthen
levees to prevent further breaks. In 1695 the Commission
again changed its policy and decided to aid in the construc-
tion of new levees. The first Federal aid in the construc-
1 World’s Work August, 1927, p. 409
2 House Committee on Flood Control 70th Cong. 1st Sess.
1927, p. 22
3 Mississippi Biver Commission, Beport 1684,. p. 287
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mmmmt
oO
tion of new flood control works under the Mississippi
1
River Commission was in the St. Francis Basin ,
The Mississippi River Commission consists of seven
members, three of whom are appointed from the Engineers
Corps of the United States Army, three Civilians, and
2
one from the United States Coast and Geodetic Survey.
It has power only to initiate plans. The law creating
the Mississippi Commission did not provide for actual
construction. On August 19, 1879 the first meeting of
the Commission was held for the purpose of organizing
plans to carry out the provisions of the act of that
year/ Actual construction had to await appropriations
from Congress. Originally, the jurisdiction of the Com-
mission for the construction of works, was limited to
the main river from the mouth of the Ohio River to the
Head of the Passes; for surveys and investigation it had
jurisdiction to the headwaters. Jurisdiction was extend-
ed from time to time, until by 1926 the Mississippi River
Commission had control over construction on the main
river from Rock Island, Illinois to the Head of the Passes,
and on tributaries in so far as they influenced floods on
4
the Mississippi River.
1 Engineering and Contracting Vol. 58 Jan. 14, 1929, p. 56
2 Cong. Record 47th Cong. 1st Session pt. 5, 1882, p. 2942
3 Ibid
4 House Com. on Levees and Improvements, Hearings 1906, p. 2
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The Commission held three or four meetings annually. Two
of the meetings consisted of inspection trips of about ten
days.
Administration committees have been created, such as
the levee committee or dredging committee. The river it-
self has been divided into districts as administrative
units. The Secretary of War details any required number
of engineers to supervise the work of contractors. The
Commission does not do the actual construction.
In the matter of levee building the Commission’s
jurisdiction has been in a large measure superseded by
the state. At first levee building was purely a local
function with Federal authority confined strictly to
matters concerning navigation. The people of the delta
saw that when the Federal government succeeded in actually
aiding in construction, some agency having wide powers
must represent the jurisdiction of the state. Therefore,
the various states created levee districts, which were
governed by commissioners in varying numbers from three to
1
twenty-four, generally appointed by the governors. The
states gave the levee districts almost unlimited powers
within their spheres. They could levy taxes and issue
bonds against the property of the districts. They could
1 House Com. on Flood Control, Hearings 1916, p. £55
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condemn property under the power of eminent domain. The
title to levees in the districts passed to the levee
1
boards and have remained there.
The Mississippi River Commission and the local boards
worked wrell together. After much study the Commission
established a standard grade for levees. Lack of funds,
naturally has caused the work to be retarded from time to
time. The Commission had to depend on appropriations by
Congress and the local boards had to raise funds by taxa-
tion and by floating loans. The levee boards resorted to
every type of tax possible, general property, acreage,
mileage, tax on railways, commodity tax on crops grown,
2
and others.
After the Flood Control Act cf 1817 most levee boards
obtained special permission from the legislatures to
exceed legal bonded indebtedness. Creditors became very
liberal with them. At that time the local board had larger
amounts of funds available than the Commission, although
generally the Commission had more funds than the local
boards
.
In times of danger from floods the conflict of juris-
diction becomes most noticeable. Fighting floods requires
military discipline and precision. Men work twenty-four
1 Cong. Record, 64th Cong. 1st Sess. pt. 11, 1816, p. 6792
2 House Com. on Flood Control Hearings 1216, p. 48
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hours if necessary and levee hoards spend money. Some
strong centralized power has been greatly needed. The
Commission has generally assumed rather full authority.
During the flood of 1913, the Mississippi River Commission
wired all local levee boards, United States employees, and
contractors, giving very explicit and detailed instructions
2
concerning the fight. Instructions were enforced.
The vast majority of the people of the delta have
been satisfied with the work of fighting flood under the
Mississippi River Commission which has progressed smoothly.
Yet, naturally there has been much criticism of the
Commission. Federal incorporation of levee boards has been
urged. Bills have been introduced to place the powers of
the Mississippi River Commission in another commission.
It has been the determination of Congress to carry on
the flood control efforts under the name of navigation,
although everyone knew that channel improvement had little
to do with the problem.
The Rivers and Harbors Bill of 1881 adopted the project
of the Mississippi River Commission with the proviso that
absolutely no part of the funds provided should be used for
building levees to protect lands against overflow and that
all funds must be spent for channel improvement.
1 House Com., on Flood Control Hearings 1922, p. 87
2 Mississippi River Commission Report, 1913, p. 3575
3 Floods and Levees of the Mississippi River, B. G. Humphreys
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Congress began the construction of levees solely in the aid
of navigation.
Various Congressional Committees have held hearings
and made reports on flood control and river improvements.
At all times they appeared anxious to have the word Navi-
gation before Congress.
The report of the Senate Committee on Commerce in
1904 stated: "the mind of the nation should be constantly
advised of the commercial importance of the Mississippi
River as a highway of commerce."
^
Slowly, however, the building of levees came to be
accepted as a movement for the purpose of flood control
by the Federal Government. The Mississippi River Commission
Report of 1912 stated that everyone knew' that the main
purpose of levees was to "protect the alluvial lands and
2
their owners against overflow."
In 1917 the Federal Government for the first time
went into levee building frankly as a measure of flood
control. The Flood Control Act of that year stated that
i
the Federal Government would spend money to control floods.
The first task of the Mississippi River Commission
after its organization was to determine what its objective
would be in building levees. It gave much thought to the
question and based its plans on the highest known flood.
1 Senate Doc. No. 245, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1904, p. 5
2 Mississippi River Commission Report 1912, p. 3724
3 House Com. on Flood Control, 70th Cong. 1st Sess. 1927
—• a .1 ' . ;
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It based its standard of levees on the great flood of
1897. Meanwhile it had been decided that three feet of
levee above this standard would furnish a proper margin
1
of safety. These standards were regarded as only tem-
porary standards which might be changed from time to time
as occasion demanded, with knowledge gained by new ex-
periences and continued study and observations.
After the flood of 1897 the Commission stated that
the flood had given sufficient proof that levees of
sufficient height and strength to control the floods
could be built at a reasonable cost and without great
difficulty.
Before the flood of 1912, the Commission stated that
it was its purpose to require the most possible from
"riparian owners with the idea of ultimately turning over
the entire burden to them," and that the time was very
O
near for the "realization of that expectation."
These hopes, however, -were quickly dispelled when in
1912 and 1915 there came two of the worst floods in history.
The entire Commission frankly admitted that these floods
demanded an entire revision of their standards. It was
estimated that the yardage of levees would have to be
doubled. After the floods of 1912 it was estimated that
the high waters would never again reach such heights.
1 House Com. on Levees and Improvements, Hearings 1906, p. 9
2 Mississippi River Commission, Report 1911, p. 12
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So the Commission revised its standards to meet conditions
shown by the results of the floods of 1912, and 1915, be-
lieving that the problem had come easily within its grasp
1
through the levee system.
In 1926 the Mississippi River Commission took the
position that the levees had reached a stage of construc-
tion that offered full protection to the delta. The
confidence of the people and the Commission was shown in
a statement of New Orleans business men who declared that
"New Orleans is as safe from Mississippi River Floods as
Boston."
o
Comparison Cubic Yards in Levees—1882-1926
Date Cubic Yards in
1882 55,000,000
1915 251,000,000
1926 472,000,000
2
C/
Height of Levees in Yazoo Basin
Date Average Height Cubic Yds per Mile
1882 8 ft. 51,500
1926 22 ft. 421,500
1 Journal of Association of Engineers-Vol . 49, Sept. 1912
p. 65
2 Engineering News Record-Vol. 90, Jan. 4, 1925, p. 27
5 House Com. on Flood Control, 70th Cong. 1st Sess. 1927-28
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In 1926 the system contained a total of 1815 miles of
levee on the main river averaging eighteen feet high, al-
though some of the levees were below what was then con-
1
sidered standard grade.
Crevasses
The number of crevasses offers a fair estimate of the
success of the levee system. In 1882 the number of breaks
in the levees reached the total of 284 with a combined
2
length of more than fifty-six miles.
Date Total Crevasses in Levees Length in Miles
1882 284 56
1883 224 34
1912-13 8 few thousand feet
1916 1
1922
Two of the worst floods in the history up to that
4
time, occurred in the years 1912-15. Although the
great flood of 1916 extended about 550 miles in the
heart of the delta and reached record heights, it left
in its ravages but one crevasse. The flood of 1922 which
1 American Railway Engineering Assoc. Bulletin, Vol. 29,
July 1927, p. 95
2 Tompkins, Riparian Lands of the Mississippi River, p. 22
3 The Outlook, Vol. 146, June 8, 1927, p. 182
4 Floods in Lower Mississippi Valley, J. M. Cline, p. 17
.
broke many records in the lower valley, caused only two
1
breaks, one of which occurred below New Orleans. Fur-
thermore, the Mississippi River Commission could right-
fully claim that no break had occurred in a levee that
had been built up to the Commission’ s standard grade and
2
section.
1 The Outlook, June 8, 1927, p. 182
2 House Committee on Flood Control Hearings, 1922, p. 34
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Cost of Construction of the Levee System
The Mississippi River Commission had utterly mis-
calculated the cost of the system in its early estimates.
The report of 1885 maintained that #11,450,000 would
1
furnish ample protection. By 1926 more than #220,900,000
2
had been expended and the system had not been completed.
The matter of carrying out any program of public
improvement depends upon the security of adequate sums.
The Commission had depended entirely on funds appro-
priated from time to time by Congress. It had often
complained of the lack of adequate funds. The Commission
had been compelled to do its work piecemeal because Congress
had not granted funds enough to carry out such a tremendous
problem. Much money had been lost because the physical
plant could not expand rapidly enough to enable it to get
much ahead of the destructive agents at work, floods, and
caving banks. Levee-building should be rapidly carried
out, as incomplete levees offer an easy mark for destruc-
tion of floods.
Levee construction calls for special machines and
specialists to operate them. Idleness means serious loss
1 Mississippi River Commission Report, 1885, p. 28
2 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-1928, Document No. 1, p. 28}
,J •
because no other industry can employ them during the
period of construction. In 1921 and 1922 seven huge
Tower machines, costing $150,000 each suspended opera-
tion for seven months and stood idle by a non-standard
levee that could have easily been built up to standard
in the meantime. While those machines stood idle, the
levee by which they stood was overtopped by a flood,
and only a heroic fight and the expenditure of $400,000,
which was a complete unnecessary waste, prevented a
serious crevasse. In this case Congress must accept
much of the responsibility for the vast amount of money
that has been wasted through:
1) Idleness of Physical Plant
2) Increased Price paid to Contractors because of
Part-Time Work
5) General Increase in Price Levels
4) Vast Amount Lost by Destruction
5) Incomplete and Non-St,andard Levees
6) Expenditures of Money to Protect Such Levees
in Floods.
7) Huge Amounts that have been Lost in Floods that
might have been prevented if the levees had been complet
1 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1922, p. 58
I .
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A well known engineer estimated in 1922 that it
would cost one-half as much to complete the levees in
five years as it would cost to complete them in fifteen,
but he doubted the wisdom of attempting to do the work
1
in less than five years.
The Mississippi River Commission urged a policy of
continuing contracts which would permit it to extend the
work from year to year. Contractors could not afford to
invest in expensive equipment unless they could have assur-
ance that Congress would make sufficient appropriations.
The Commission had been definitely committed to the policy
2
of contracting for the work.
Prior to 1917 Congress disregarded the plea for a
continuous program. On two occasions, however, Congress
did adopt the idea of such a 'program.
In 1892 the appropriation act provided $2,000,000
and gave the Mississippi River Commission authority to
contract for works and materials not to exceed $2,665,000
per year for the next three years.
The act of 1907 provided for another three year pro-
4
gram totaling nine million dollars.
1 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1922
p. 61
2 House Report, No. 500, 65rd Cong., 2nd Sess., 1914
Pt. 2, p. 6
5 Mississippi River Improvement, R. S. Taylor
4 Mississippi River Commission Report 1907, p. 2607
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The economy of a continuous program afforded one of
the strongest arguments for flood control acts of 1917
and 1983 . The act of 1917, for the first time, pro-
vided money openly for flood control and the act of 1983
set forth its purpose as "controlling the floods of the
1
Mississippi River and continuing its improvements."
The Flood Act of 1917
The flood act of 1917 introduced a new principle
of sharing Federal and Local contributions. It had been
the practice prior to 1917 of the Commission to meet
the funds of the levee boards very much on a fifty-fifty
basis although Congressional appropriations had not re-
quired any local contributions. The law of 1917 provid-
ed that the United States would pay two dollars to one
dollar from the local boards for levee construction, but
the levee boards had to furnish rights of way and pay
maintenance charges in addition to their one-third of
the cost of construction, thus making it almost a dollar-
2
for-dollar proposition. The Commission expressed its
satisfaction with this arrangement because it felt that
the local boards should know definitely how much they
1 House Committee on Flood Control—Bill No. 8219, p. 7
2 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings, 1916, p. 4
, 1
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would have to pay when they came to the Commission for
aid in construction. The people of the delta also ex-
pressed their gratitude. This definite division of
funds made a policy of continuing contracts all the
more desirable because it became very necessary for the
Commission and the levee boards to have funds at the
same time. The construction of works had lagged sev-
eral times since 1917 because one party did not have
1
funds when the other did.
The flood act of 1917 was by far the most liberal
act up to that time for the purpose of controlling the
Mississippi. It provided for $45,000,000 in five years,
$20,000,000 of which was to be spent together with
$15,000,000 from the local levee boards in building and
2
repairing levees. It was most unfortunate that this
act came the very year the United States entered the
World War. Under these conditions Congress reduced the
amount of annual appropriations by extending the period
of time to seven years instead of five. Under the condi-
tions of inflated prices the money did not go nearly so
far as it did under pre-war conditions. The extraordinary
expenses spent during the war period and during the flood
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-1928, Bill No. 8219, p. 11
2 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1922, p. 216
,.
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of 1923 reduced the percentage spent on levees, so
that actually, only about $17,000,000 was spent for
1
levee construction.
The flood control act of 1923 provided the liberal
2
amount of $60,000,000 for the protection of the delta.'
Congress appropriated $10,000,000 as the first annual
installment in 1923.
Bank Stabilization
The policy of the Mississippi Biver Commission was
largely the levee policy. Bank stabilization was another
very important policy of the Commission. Disintegration
of the banks proved a very serious problem. Caving
banks ate into the levees and carried them into the river.
Near Point Pleasant, Missouri from 1398 to 1922 the levee
had to be rebuilt four times due to the caving banks,
3
The last location was three miles back of the first one.
The Lower Yazoo District in 1922 had 184 miles of levee.
From 1882 to 1922 it had lost 212 miles in a strategic
4
retreat from caving banks. It has been estimated that
$100,000,000 spent on construction since 1822 has been
5
lost because of the levees falling into the river.
1 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Pt . 6
1927-1928, p. 4251
2 Ibid
—
p. 4251
3 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1922, p. 69
4 Ibid
—
p. 29
5 Ibid—1, p. 4252
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The Mississippi River Commission has strongly favored
bank stabilization as a matter of economy and preven-
tion.
Revetment costs much money. Because the works
actually belong under the water, this part of the work
has been assigned to the Federal Government. The local
board has also spent large sums of money for the im-
portant work. Up to 1927 the Federal Government had
spent |58,000,000 for revetment, and the work had not
1
been more than one-fourth completed. In 1922 revet-
ment cost $240,000 on the average mile whereas the aver-
2
age mile of levee cost only $150,000.
The problem of revetment is to prevent the dis-
integration of the banks and to stabilize them. The re-
vetments are made of willow saplings woven into huge
mattresses twelve to eighteen inches thick, 250-500 feet
wide and sometimes a thousand feet long. These bank sap-
lings are from three to six inches in diameter, forty to
fifty feet long and are held together by wire cables.
They are made on the surface of the stream on large flat
barges. At low water they are fastened into the river by
means of placing tons of huge stones upon them. The willow
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-1928, Document No. 1, p. 29
2 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1922, p. 65
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will not decay under water and its flexibility renders
it suitable for weaving. This type of revetment has
proved most successful in preventing "scouring and
sloughing" and because of its flexibility it conforms
1
to the irregularities of the banks
.
The St. Francis District of Missouri had had some
success with the Woodburry System of revetment. This
system is called "retards." These retards consist of
large trees strung along very powerful cables and anchored
at the head of the "retard" to concrete at the bottom
of the river. When the river attempts to undermine the
trees they sink deeper into the river and protect its
banks. This system has not offered the same degree of
protection as the revetments. The policy of the Miss-
issippi River Commission still provides for bank revet-
ment as a very necessary part of the flood control pro-
gram.
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-1928, Document No. 1, p. 24
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Proposed Plans for the Control
of the Mississippi Floods
The greatest natural enemy of the people of
the United States has been the floods of the Miss-
issippi River. From the early colonial days the
alluvial lands of the Mississippi Valley have drawn
the attention of the American people to the possi-
bilities which they presented as the real garden
spot of the continent. This interest has been great-
est during the times of floods. The people of the
United States, blessed with the world’s great garden
have paid vast sums of money for its conquest by seek-
ing a way to control the floods of the Mississippi
River.
Thousands of plans have been presented by men
from all walks of life. Congressional Committees,
Presidents, Army Engineers, and many organizations
have given prolonged and deep study to the problem.
Such a huge problem naturally would create a wide
difference of opinion even among those men best quali-
fied to solve it.
The following methods proposed by technical men
who have applied much knowledge and study to the prob-
lem are the most worthy of consideration:
'.
l
.
.
1) To strengthen the river by cutting across the
numerous bends so as to hasten the discharge of the
water.
g) To construct reservoirs either on the head-
waters of the various tributaries or along the main
stream to impound and hold back the water.
5) To reforest and afforest large areas to in-
crease the sink-in and percolation.
4) To construct outlets or spillways to divert
the water through them to the Gulf of Mexico.
5) To build levees sufficiently high and strong
to confine the water to the main stream.
6) To combine several or all of the above methods
into one comprehensive scheme that would include the
whole river system.
All these methods had been tested in European,
Asiastic or African countries long before the Miss-
1
issippi problem received attention. The Mississippi
River, however, presents a distinct problem of its own,
which must be studied with much allowance for its own
peculiarities
.
A. E. Morgan, who has made an extensive life study
of floods stated, "No similar problem of similar size
has ever been mastered by man. The treatment of this
1 Floods and Levees of the Mississippi River, B. G.
Humphreys, p. 32
.{
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mighty stream must be considered from the standpoint of
1
its peculiar and sometimes almost mysterious vagaries."
Vast Amount of Water
The vast amount of water which the Mississippi
carries to the Gulf of Mexico and the remarkable varia-
bility is one of the outstanding peculiarities of the
"Father of Waters." The low water discharge reaches the
small amount of about 70,000 second-feet or 70,000 cubic
2
feet per second. On the other hand, the Mississippi
River Commission estimated the maximum discharge of the
flood of 1927 at 2,800,000 second-feet which represents
the greatest volume of water the power of man ever at tempt
-
o
ed to control. The difference in gauge readings be-
tween high and low water varies at different points but
reaches as much as fifty feet at points about the middle
4
of the length of the delta.
Geological Formation of Lower Basin
Formerly the delta was a shallow arm of the ocean
extending far into the continent. This shallow area of
1 Annals of American Academy of Political and Social
Science, January 1928, d. 56
2 Ibid. p. 11
3 House Com. on Flood Control, 70th Cong. 1st Sess. 1927-
1928, Document No. 24 p. 103
4 House Doc., No. 35, 17 Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 13
,
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water became filled with sediment brought down by
1
the great river. The entire delta has been built
up through ages to its present form by its present
worst enemy. The bed of the lower Mississippi lies
wholly within the alluvial deposit of the river. In
1908-1308 the Mississippi River Commission made bor-
ings which established the depth of the undoubtedly
alluvial deposits beneath the bed of the river between
2
Cairo and New Orleans at 151 feet. Logs have been
found in many j laces at cepths ranging from 100-300
feet. The velocity of the river decreased as it rose
ana flowed out over the surrounding country and deposit
ed much sediment. The coarsest sediment was deposited
nearest the river. In this way, banks were built up
of these new coarse materials until they became higher
than the surrounding country. This process continued
until the plane of the delta adjacent to the river slop
off at right angles to the river with the interior for
five or six miles at the rate of three or four feet per
O'o
mile. The slope of the delta to the Gulf of Mexico
is only eight inches per mile. Thus, it is true, that
1 Mississippi River Commission Report, 1882, p. 2315
2 Rouse Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927, 1928, Document No. 1, p. 6
3 Ibid- -Document No. 17, p. 50
—i b
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the river banks occupy the highest part of the delta
and the lends slope away from the stream far more
rapidly than they slope toward the Gulf, This peculiar
situation accounts for the fact that the first settlers
generally occupied the banks, while land further from
the river remained unoccupied. It also explains why
front riparian proprietors have suffered less from
floods than those who lived several miles from the river.
The territory through which the Mississippi Fiver
flows from Cairo to the Gulf forms one of the flattest
surfaces in America. This great fan-shaped, gently
sloping plane has been formed by the river and in turn
makes a bed, through which the river flows. This allu-
vial plane is extremely flat. The actual distance from
the mouth of the Ohio to the Gulf coast is approximately
five hundred miles. The length of the river from Cairo
to the Gulf totals more than twice the air-line distance.
The added distance has been created by the numerous "ox-
bow" bends which the river has made in its fragile banks.
These banks have been built from loose and unconsolidated
materials which crumble and erode very easily. The e~
normous pressure of the water has cut away the ear.th and
1 House Feport, No. 44, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, 1872
p . 6
2 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1S27, Document No. 17, p. 29
.•
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sought a grade that it could maintain. At length,
the river established a course, rather permanent, with
a fall of inches per mile. Many of these "ox-bow”
bends, as they are termed, are only a few hundred feet
across the necks, while they are several miles around.
The river constantly works on these bends and often cuts
across the narrow necks. Because the water continuous-
ly cuts away the soil from its banks, the river is said
to "eat" its banks. "Eating" its banks has produced
most of the vast amount of sediment that has furnished a
1
major problem for hydraulic engineers.
At flood the river has an increased velocity which
gives the vast flood waters a force of about 60,000,000
horse power. This force is consumed in eating away the
banks of the river, stirring up the bed and getting the
2
water into the gulf. The eroded material from the
banks, most of which goes into the stream at flood time,
has been estimated by the Mississippi River Commission at
rvO
approximately 1,000,000 cubic yards per mile per year.
Added to this vast amount of sediment are the great addi-
tions from the river’s many tributaries, especially from
1 Speeches on Levees of Mississippi River, Barbour Lewis,
June 6, 1874, p, 6
2 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927, Document No. 24, p. 102
3 Mississippi River Commission Report 1892, p. 5110
.'
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the Missouri, Arkansas and Red Rivers. The total
amount of soil that the Mississippi has to transport
and dispose of annually has been authoritatively
placed at more than a billion cubic yards. The sedi-
ment moves down the river for indefinite distances,
most of it rolls along the bottom of the river. The
currents of the river produce scouring at some places,
deposits at others, so that the bed of the river is com-
posed of alternating bars and pools which move down the
river in so called "waves." These "waves” create a con-
dition whereby the shallow places of one week may be
the deep ones of the next and vice-versa.
A large number of channels lead from the Mississippi,
some to lakes or swamps and others to the Gulf. These
peculiarities of the Mississippi have caused some con-
sideration by experts and laymen as well . To an unskilled
layman it would appear to be an easy matter to divert the
waters of the Mississippi through some of those channels.
Many people, therefore, have opposed plans that would con-
fine the floods to the river. They believe that flood
heights could be lowered by diverting the waters with
much less effort and at a much less cost.
The vast area from the Rocky Mts. to the Allegheny
Appalachian Ridge on the East, drained by the Mississippi
and its branches and the complicated causes of floods
Ml
have created a wide difference of opinions as to the
proper methods of control. Topography, climate,
precipitation and other phases of the wide drainage
areas have certainly furnished ample material for dis-
cussion, study and disagreement. The floods of the
Mississippi are complicated by many combinations of
waters from many tributaries. The Ohio has always been
an important factor in all great floods. Other tribu-
taries vary greatly in the amounts of their contribu-
tions .
"Cut -Offs ”
The official reports made by United States En-
gineers have universally condemned cut-offs. Expert
opinion agrees that cut-offs only pile up the flood
' i
waters below them. If the river could be straightened
and so held, it might be of some help to straighten.
But if a cut-off occurs, the river immediately proceeds
to establish a new maintainable course by immediately
creating other curves to take the place of the one it
has lost. Various countries of Europe have tried cut-
offs as a means of reducing floods. This method has
been universally abandoned. They have not only failed
to work, but they have made conditions worse . In the
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1327-1S28, Document No. 17, p. 55
..
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earlier development of flood control, the interests
of navigation and those of flood control were in con-
stant conflict. Navigation interests have been very
active in reducing the length of the channel.
Reservoi rs
The Chicago Tribune states that the dar age from
floods is "felt down stream but the responsibility is
1
up stream." Thus, the only sensible v/ay to control
floods in the lower valley is to construct reservoirs
on the tributaries that will enable the people to con-
trol the waters before they reach the main river. The
great floods are caused by minor floods from the small-
er flood areas combining their waters by a concentration
2
in the lower river. The Inland Waterways Commission
reported that the only "logical way to control a river
is to control the head waters of its tributaries" and
the only way to prevent floods "is to use these reser-
voirs to catch and temporarily hold the flood waters to
prevent them from descending upon the lower valleys in
such large volumes." Undoubtedly, the floods of any
1 Chicago Tribune, April 18, 1927, p. 10
2 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Pt. 11
1927-1928, p. 11008
8 Senate Document No. 525, 60th Congress, 1st Sess.
1908, p. 451
——
stream could be controlled by the construction of an
adequate number of reservoirs of sufficient size and
favorable location. It has long been a question of
controversy between the large groups of students of
drainage and flood control, whether such control could
be secured at any reasonable cost by comparison with
other systems.
Reservoirs have been built for the purpose of
flood control in the United States. The Miami Conser-
vancy District has five reservoirs to prevent the destruc-
1
tive floods of the Miami River. They were designed
to affect only the larger floods and to remain empty at
other times. These works have, thus far, proved very
successful in affording the designed protection to the
2
Miami Valley. The success of the Miami Conservancy
has convinced friends of reservoirs to maintain that
flooas on the Mississippi could be controlled by reser-
voirs. The United States constructed six large reser-
voirs in the State of Minnesota for the purpose of aid-
S
ing low water navigation on the upper Mississippi.
The Pittsburg Flood Commission resolved to construct a
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-1S26, Document No. 2, p. 4
2 Ibid
—
p. 4
5 Ibid
—
p. 4
'
system of reservoirs, although to date, this work has
not been done. The reclamation service has built a
number of large reservoirs on the headwaters of the
1
western tributaries. These successful examples of
actual reservoirs in operation, together with exhaus-
tive study of highly competent men, have formed the
basis for most of the support of reservoirs. It has
been estimated that enough flood waters of the Ohio
could be controlled feasibly to reduce the flood heights
on the Mississippi seven, feet at Memphis and eight at
Vicksburg; by construction of enough reservoirs on the
headwaters of the tributaries of the Mississippi the
flood heights would be reduced at Cairo 5.7 feet, and
5.4 feet at the mouth of the Red River, at an approxi-
O
mate cost of $1,292,000,000. But such an estimate
made the project utterly impractical. Another section
of this report, however, stated that reservoirs could
be built for $242,000,000 on the Arkansas and White Rivers
that would reduce the stage at Arkansas City 8 feet, and
at Red River, 5 feet. Those who have urged reservoirs,
have urged them as an aid to flood control rather than
the means by which floods could be controlled. They
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-1928, Document No. 2, p. 4
2 Ibid
—
p. 1
.,
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have demanded reservoirs as an additional safeguard
instead of a substitute for levees.
Much consideration has been given to the possi-
bility of selling electricity that could be generated
by the water held by these reservoirs. This idea has
been rejected by the best engineers. Reservoirs have
the possibility of combining both functions to a limit-
ed extent only, for the two purposes are opposite by
1
nature. For flood control the reservoirs would need
to be empty, and for power generation they would need
to be full. Thus, as they were used more for one pur-
pose they would reduce the utility for the other.
Arguments of Opponents of Reservoir System
The opponents of reservoirs have rejected the pro-
position because they feel that reservoirs are impracticable
because of the prohibitive cost as compared with other flood
control works.
The Mississippi River Commission has severely criti-
cized the reservoir system. Col. C. M. Townsend of the
coromission asserted that a reservoir at the junction of
the Mississippi and Ohio, nlarge enough to have held the
flood waters of 1S12 would have been 7000 square miles in
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-8, Document No. 2, p. 18
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area and fifteen feet deep, requiring excavation that
would furnish dirt for 7000 miles of levee 150 feet high.”
Colonel C. L. Potter while President of Mississippi
River Commission stated that ’’flood control for the Ohio
Valley alone at the same rate of cost for the Miami Valley,
which is the only real example of flood control in the
2
United States by reservoirs, would cost {$1, 718, 000, 000.
”
The Pittsburg Flood Commission found that by build-
ing seventeen dams at the estimated cost of $21,672,100,
a flood of 55.5 feet on the Pittsburg gauge would be lowered
to 27 feet, and that further protection would cost much
fu
more in proportion. Engineers have frequently stated
that to cut the Ohio River absolutely at St. Paul would
have no appreciable effect on the river at Cairo, only
55,000 second feet in 1915 out of a total of 2,000,000
4
second feet. The Mississippi, above St. Paul has the
largest system of reservoirs in the world with 95,000,000,000
5
cubic feet capacity.” The board of United States Engineers
in 1927 estimated that this system ’’reduced flood heights
1 Flood Control of Mississippi River—C. M. Townsend
—
p. 6
2 Engineering hews—Record, April 2, 1925, p. 557
5 Journal of Association of Engineers, September 12, p. 57
4 Engineering and Contracting, March 1914, p. 540
5 Ibid—
4
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one-fifth of an inch in 1912 ana slightly increased, flood
1
at Cairo.
The Engineers of the United States Array and Miss-
issippi River Commission have even gone so far as to
suggest that the danger from probable breaks among the
scores of gigantic dams wpuld be "as much as the danger
£
from present flood conditions."
Forestation and Deforestation
During recent years the relation of forestation and
deforestation to floods and stream control has been a
much discussed topic. Many believe that devastating
floods of late years have been caused by the destruction
of forests. Forested areas do hold back a portion of the
water that falls upon them. It is, therefore, essential
that forests receive consideration in any plan that would
have a definite place in permanent control of the Miss-
issippi and its tributaries.
The opponents of flood control by re-forestation con-
tend that de-forestation has not caused floods, that
forests could not aid materially in the control of floods,
that floods occurred when the forests stood. They point
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1927-
1928, Document No. 2, p. 7
2 Journal of Association of Engineers, September 1912, p. 59
aoc no 1
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out that a most remarkable series of floods occurred in
the period of 1657-1867. No one coula even hope to
restore the forests to the conditions of that period.
Gen. Harry Taylor, an engineer member of the Mississippi
River Commission estimated that "it would take 555,000
square miles of forest reserve to reduce as much as one
1
foot a great flood at Memphis."
Colonel Edward Burr of the Corps of Engineers of
the United States Army made a careful study of the Merrimac
River in New Hampshire and Massachusetts. This basin
offered a splendid experimental case because complete
records were available for the period of de-forestation
and then of re-forestation. This study showed little or
2
no relation of de-forestation to stream flow. Raphael
Zon stated that forests can store a quantity of water equal
to a .16 of an inch, and in very favorable conditions .24
of an inch. This amount represents but an insignificant
fraction of the great quantities of precipitation that
3
cause floods.
Foresters claim that an extensive program of re-
forestation could be felt in five years, and maximum results
1 Scientific Monthly, April 1923, p. 346
2 National Waterways Commission, Report 1912, p. 29
3 American Forests and Forest Life—Raphael Zon, July 1927,
p. 38
-'
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could be obtained in twenty years. "It should be borne
in mind that of the technical foresters not one of any
authority has even suggested that forests would control
floods."
^
They maintain that in stream control upper water-
sheds tributary to the river form an important factor,
that forests only supplement engineering works. Nor
would they plant agricultural lands in trees; it is only
the vast areas of waste lands that they recommend be
planted in forests.
There does seem to be an unanimous agreement that
forests do aid to some extent in flood control. The Miss-
issippi River Commission did not study that type of area
but it did suggest the value of forests in preventing
erosion. The sediment in the Mississippi River at flood
time has been always a serious problem. The prevention
of erosion would perhaps be the most important benefit
of forests to stream control. Forests would prevent much
erosion that takes place on vast areas of waste lands at
present
.
Diversion Channels
In its natural state the Mississippi River flowed
to the Gulf at flood times through many mouths. Long
1 Journal of Forestry, May 1927, p. 508
.. 5
'
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bayous, natural outlets, took the water from the main
channel. The construction of levees has closed these
former outlets. "On the lower Mississippi River the
pressing problem has not been to let out the surplus
waters but to keep the river from breaking through its
1
old outlets." The apparent ease with which the flood
waters could be taken away by diversion channels or
waste weirs has caused this method of flood control to
receive universal recommendation among laymen. In 1850
De Bow’s Review published a plan to take the floods to
the Gulf through a vast diversion channel from the
Arkansas over very much the same route that was accept-
ed as a part of the 1927 plan. The Ellet report of 1852
gave arguments both for and against diversion channels
but concluded that the advantages outweighed the dis-
advantages.^
The place of residence has had much influence upon
the attitude of those interested in flood-control methods.
Upper-river men favored reservoirs, middle-river men have
wranted levees and lower-river men have demanded diversion
channels in a large number of cases. The most active
agent working for diversion of flood waters since 1922
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Cong., 1st Sess.
1927-1928, No. 70, p. 80
2 Plans for the Protection of the Delta from Inundation,
Charles Ellet, p. 18
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has been the Safe River Commission of One Hundred of
New Orleans. This committee consisted of prominent
engineers and students whose purpose was to secure
safety from floods for New Orleans.
The argument of these ,TOutletters n is that the
flood water can admittedly be taken away very easily
by diversion channels below the mouth of the Arkansas
to such an extent to remove serious floods below that
point. The river naturally has sought its former out-
lets that have been closed by levees. Many crevasses
in past floods have poured water into these natural out-
lets. New Orleans has frequently been benefited by the
crevasses that ruined the people of nearby communities.
"The wealth of New- Orleans has enabled it to maintain a
margin of safety over its less wealthy neighbors by a
1
competitive system of levee buildi g. n The crevasse
at Poydras in 1922 gave New Orleans 2.7 feet relief and
it had some influence for a distance of 160 miles up and
2
down the river. The supporters of the outlet system have
_.ointed out the fact that levees have been built higher
and higher after each great flood with apparently no way
of telling what the ultimate height will be, and that
withdrawal of water from the river offers the only real
1 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1916, p. 105
2 Ibid—p. 159

1
hope of control.
hew Orleans has made a special plea for definite
control height because of its port facilities. These
port facilities have been built on the levees and must
be kept above flood heights. It will cost many millions
to raise the wharves and other facilities which New
Orleans has built with public funds. The citizens of
New Orleans for several years have urged that levees
have not and cannot give absolute protection. The re-
markable series of floods from 1912-1922-1927 shook the
faith of the people of the lower part of the delta in
the levee system and demonstrated to them the value of
5
crevasses in reducing flood heights.
These "Outletters” have met with determined and
stubborn resistance. Prior to 1927 practically every re-
port by an United States Official Board of engineers
severely condemned the outlet theory of control. Until
after the great floods of 1927, practically all the com-
mercial bodies and all the leading newspapers opposed
diversion.
The Mississippi River Commission which was created
in 1879, and which has dominated the flood control policy
1 Chicago Tribune, April 25, 1879, p. 32
2 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings .1916, o. 113
3 Ibid—p. 113
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strongly opposed anything but levees prior to the floods
of 1927. It felt thet New Orleans desired protection of
her wharves, which had been built on levees below stand-
ards set by the Commission.
In 1893, however, three members of the Commission
filed a minority report which agreed with the majority,
that a diversion channel that took off water at all stages
of the river would be inadvisable. It suggested that a
waste weir that would take off the tops of the floods
might be beneficial. Members of the Commission have fre-
quently admitted that flood heights would certainly be
reduced by spillways. Until 1927, the Commission main-
tained one very important outlet.
When the water in the Mississippi is higher than
the water in the Red River, it flows through Old River
which connects the Mississippi and the Red, into the Red
and the Atchafalaya, then through the Atchafalaya to the
Gulf. The outlet was the subject of a very detailed study
in 1914 by a special board of engineers. This board
favored keeping open the Atchafalaya Outlet in spite of
strong pressure in favor of closing it. ^ Until 1927 the
Commission was hostile to diversion because it clung to
its policy of levees only.
The main argument of the Commission against diverting
1 House Document. No. 641, 63rd Congress, ond Session, p. 2
'
flood waters has been based on the supposed effects of
diversion on the main stream of the river. The action
of an outlet means increased velocity above it, and
decreased velocity below it. Such a condition would
cause large deposits of sediment in the bed of the main
stream below, this would in turn cause a piling up of
water ana give only temporary relief. Silt-bearing
streams have complex engineering problems in handling
silt as well as in handling the flood waters. The opinion
that sediment would deposit below such outlets and so
disturb and limit its carrying capacity has not been
universally held, although it has met with the sanction
of many engineers.
The danger that the flood water might break through
the Gulf of Mexico and cause the river to leave its
present channel has been the cause of much opposition to
diversion.
The soil of the lower delta erodes very easily. The
distance to the Gulf of Mexico by some of the natural
channels is only half as far as it is by the main river.
nThe total difference in elevation being the same, the
velocity of the currents would be much greater than that
1
of main stream.” When the slope of the territory
adjacent to the river is taken into consideration the
1 Journal of Association of Engineers, March 1311, p. 188
'.
situation becomes more alarming. The natural fall of
the Mississippi in the vicinity of New Orleans is about
one-tenth of a foot per mile. The slope of the land
from the river to Lake Borgne two miles away totals
eight feet. It has been the fear of most hydraulic
engineers anu the people of the lower part of the Ita^
that the river might break through anu make a new mouth.
The record of the Atchafalaya River furnishes a good
basis for this contention. In our early history the
Atchafalaya was only a very small stream. Flood waters
from the Mississippi had enlarged it, until at flood tide
it approached the size of the main stream. Government
engineers became concerned with the possibility that the
Mississippi River would turn entirely through it and
built engineering works to stop the enlargement. The
engineers believed that without these works the Mississipp
would have gone through the Atchafalaya.
Another point against the outlet theory has been
that it would prove expensive and impracticable in com-
parison with the cost and practicability of control by
levees. If diversion channels are used they must either
be controlled by levees or permitted to run wild ana per-
haps flood large areas. In the opinion of the Mississippi
River, these diversion channels would not lessen the cost
of control but would increase it.
.
If waste weirs should be constructed proper founda-
tions and regulation of flow would be difficult and ex-
pensive to obtain. If a diversion channel protected by
levees should be used, the channel would have to be
maintained and the flow would have to be carefully regu-
lated. Too great a velocity would be disastrous and too
1
slow a one would cause it to fill with sediment. In
1925 the Chief of Engineers said at New Orleans, that it
would be cheaper to blow up the country levee when the
city was menaced than it would be to pay the interest on
the big investment of five or six million doll: rs to
2
build a spillway. The Mississippi River Commission in
1322 concluded that a spillway with a capacity of £50,000
second feet would be very hazardous and too expensive and
that both the hazard and the expense would increase rapid
ly as the danger of floods on the main stream was reduced
Thd people of New Orleans represented by the Safe
River Committee of One Hundred, and the Mississippi River
could not agree on the method of control. The policy of
the Federal government, through 1926 adhered strictly to
the theory of confining the water to the main stream by
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-1928, Document No. 17, p. 50
2 Ibid—No. 10, p. 7
5 New Orleans Time, May 25, 1922
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levees. "One Congressional Committee after another
almost unanimously aft irmed the most absolute confidence
1
in the sufficiency of levees."
The Mississippi River Commissioners from the be-
ginning and for nearly fifty years almost unanimously
agreed that confinement of the waters was the only way.
Legislatures of delta states contributed their
support to levees, by resolutions and memorials that
demonstrated their confidence in the proposals of the
Mississippi River Commission. The great convention of
the Mississippi River Improvement and Levee Association
which consisted of over one thousand delegates from twenty-
seven states and one hundred sixty-six cities, at New
Orleans in 1900 expressed absolute confidence in levees
and condemned all methods for reducing flood heights.
This convention claimed to have presented the "unalterable
sentiment of millions of American citizens."
People who reasoned for levees only asserted that
confinement presented not only the best way to control
floods on the Mississippi, but the only practicable way.
They further stated that all other plans had been tried
in Europe and had failed. In their opinion, no other
1 Senate Document No. 245, 58th Congress, 2nd Session,
1904, p. 1
2 Senate Committee on Commerce, Hearings 1904, p. 44
3 Scientific American, February 15, 1913, p. 13
..
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workable plan could be devised but to build levees
1
sufficiently high and strong enough to hold.
They pointed with pride to the decreasing num-
ber of crevasses and the decreasing amount of lands
inundated by each great flood. If crevasses occurred,
it was not the fault of the plan, but because the plan
had not been completed.
The construction of a levee system called for the
determination of standard heights and dimensions.
The Mississippi River Commission undertook to determine
a basis of standard as shorn from information about past
floods. Flood after flood occurred. Each time the Com-
mission changed its standards of grade and section to
2 .
meet new conditions. Many of the levees never caught
up with the ever increasing standards. The weaker levees
naturally broke first. Prior to the flood of 1927, the
supporters of levees always steadfastly maintained that
no standard levee had ever failed to offer protection,
and that a complete system of standard levees would offer
ample protection for the whole delta. The vast majority
of people believed that at last the Commission had been
able to ascertain very definitely just how strong to
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-1928, Document No. 2, p. 4
2 Ibid—Document No. 1, p. 25
.••
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make the levees to -withstand the highest flood that
in all probability would ever come down the river.
Two Schools of Engineers
At the time of the formation of the Mississippi
River Commission two schools of engineers in the United
States held opposite views on the effect of levees on
the river.
' One school held that levees would increase the
velocity and scour out the channel so that no increase
in flood heights would occur.
The other group contended that levees would not en-
large the river section and that greatly increased
heights would occur. The Mississippi River Commission
contended that floods confined between embankments youId
scour out the bed and low -flood heights.
The first real shock came when the public discovered
the fact that levees actually caused floods to go higher.
They caused floods at Memphis to rise more than eight feet
above their former levels; at several places increases
were still greater. In 1914 it was estimated by an official
board of engineers that the flood of 1912 would have been
increased four feet at most lower river points if the
levees had been completed and had held. But the same re-
1 Mississippi River Committee Report, 1881, p. 12-c
a
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port contended that the increase would have been tempor-
ary because the waters would have finally enlarged the
1
channel
.
From the early beginnings there has been opposition
to levees only. The real fight in an organized way be-
gan in 1912. Many engineers and laymen had become con-
2
vinced that "some supplemental aids had to be adopted."
Congressional Committees began to hear much testimony
from all parts of the country. The opponents of the levee
system proclaimed that the Mississippi River Commission
o
was the "most colossal blunder in engineering history."
Nature of Delta Soil
The major contention of the opponents grew out of
the increasing height of floods from year to year and
the corresponding increasing height of levees. As the
floods rose higher and higher from time to time the
Mississippi River Commission simply raised the grade and
increased the section of the standard levee. This great-
ly complicated the whole problem. The nature of the del-
ta soil suggests that it forms a very poor foundation for
any structure of great weight. Recent years have brought
1 House Document No. 841, 63rd Congress, 2nd Session, p. 3
2 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1922, p. 36
3 Manufacturers' Record, June 9, 1927, p. 55
.a
numerous levee breaks from collapse due to poor founda-
tions. ' The mouths of small tributary streams and
outlets for swamps to drain into the Mississippi River
form very poor foundations. The land is spongy and
unstable. Just at those very places the levees must be
highest. Engineers now feel that levees of greater
grade and section cannot be supported.
The worst feature of weak foundations is that they
sometimes do not show until the flood reaches great
heights and exerts great pressure. The Ferriday levee
in 1922 showed no weakness at 55.3 feet on the Natchez
gauge but failed completely at 55 feet. Hymelia levee
appeared secure at 20.3 feet on the Canal Street gauge
2
but went out at 21.5 feet.
Many weaknesses show from the beginning. The con-
tractors cannot be held for they secure the finest materials
and the best possible foundation. Sinking levees to con-
tractors mean that they pile up more earth until the sink-
ing stops and the embankments reach the required standards.
This problem becomes more serious when the levees cave
into the river with ever-caving banks, because the land
nearest the river offers the best side for levees. The
1 Problem of Mississippi River, B. E. Moses, p. 7
2 Report of Engineering Committee to Safe River Committee
of 100, 1922, p. 7
.-
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land there is not only higher, but also has a thicker
deposit of alluvial soil of more substantial materials
1
over the quick sand foundation. This is a most
serious defect of the system. Crevasses cannot be
eliminated under such conditions. Crevasses become
much more dangerous as the size of the levees increases
and as the population behind them grows.
Opponents of levees have asserted that the bed of
the Mississippi was rising and getting higher than the
surrounding territory. Even some of our leading men
rather closely related to flood control as late as 1927
still maintained that silt constantly raised the bed of
the river. Some of our leading magazines also still
clung to that erroneous idea. The fact that the banks
of the river rise higher than the adjoining lands may
be responsible for that belief. The Mississippi River is
a very deep river with very high banks.
The Mississippi River Commission early established
a very scientific system of bench marks and soundings so
that as long as the bench marks remained the cross sec-
OC
tions of the river could be reproduced scientifically.
Minute surveys were made in 1882, 1894 and 1904 which
showed conclusively that the bed of the river had not
1 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1916, p. 63-4
2 Senate Committee on Commerce, Hearings 1904, p. 53
l
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risen. The cross section had increased very slightly
which may be due to a probable error. The evidence
seems indisputable that the bed of the river has not
risen.
After each flood the opposition to levees has
grown stronger. The Mississippi River Commission* s re-
port asserted after each flood that the results had
shown more clearly than ever that a system of standard
levees would control floods; any failure of the system
was due to the fact that it had not been completed.
Naturally, as the floods grew higher and the damages
grew heavier, and the Commission still clung to its
theory of levees, severe criticism of the Mississippi
River Commission developed. The members of the Miss-
issippi River Commission had been dominated by the Corps
of Engineers of the United States Army. The Commission
felt that its duty was to uphold the policy of levees
only because the Corps of Engineers upheld that policy.
Even the big flood of 1922 failed to cause any change,
until the great calamity of the 1927 floods. Governor
Pinchot quotes Theodore Roosevelt as saying it was the
army engineers who kept the plan of the Inland Waterways
1
Commission from being adopted.
1 The Survey, July 1, 1927, p. 567
',
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Comprehensive Plan
The final plan which has been adopted is termed
the Comprehensive Plan for flood control. This plan,
proposes a combination of all the plans already dis-
cussed. People who favor the comprehensive plan insist
that the final correct way will be a combination of all
methods. They admit that levees will go far toward
solving the flood problem but maintain that other aids
1
must be added to insure success. The supporters of
the comprehensive plan favor forests, reservoirs or
any other plan for flood control in addition to levees.
Prior to 1927, the Ellet report of 1852 wa r the
only important official United States Engineering re-
port that suggested any iaea of a comprehensive plan.
Ellet’ s report suggested levees, spillways and reser-
voirs. President Roosevelt by appointing the Inla.nd
Waterways Commission which urged a ’’scientific study of
all rivers as units from their sources to their mouths,
2
gave great impetus to the movement.” The National
Waterways Commission which Congress created in 1909 has
served to further the idea. The Pittsburg Flood Com-
mission and the Ohio Conservancy District have been strong
1 Speech on Levees of the Mississippi, House, June 6, 1674
Barbour Lewis
2 Senate Committee on Commerce, Hearings, 1917, x 8
*.
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influences for an elaborate plan of control.
For several years. Senator Francis G. Newlands
introduced a flood control bill into every session of
Congress which provided for large expenditures to con-
1
tr-ol rivers from their sources to their mouths. In
1917 Senator Broussard joined him in introducing the
Newlands-Broussard Eill. This provided for an elaborate
plan of co-ordination of agencies and a comprehensive
2
plan of control. He never succeeded.
The death of Senator Newlands in 1S19 relieved the
Mississippi Fiver Commission of his opposition. The only
tangible result of his long and determined fight was
section 18 of the Rivers and Harbors Bill of 1917,* by
which the levees-only people were compelled to accept a
compromise that allotted £250,000 for investigations and
o
reports concerning various plans of stream regulation.
But the fight did not end with Senator Newland's death.
Governor Pinchot and many others have continued to argue
that no one point of view could control, that plans should
be co-ordinated into a united single plan.
J. Russell Smith has recommended a most comprehen-
sive plan that ranges all the way from a new type hill-
1 Journal of Association of Engineers, October 1912, p. 115
2 Senate Committee on Commerce, Hearings 1917, p. 15
3 The Nation, May 11, 1927, p. 521
.
farming to a utilization of the silt from the Miss-
issippi Fiver as a fertilizer. He would, retain levees,
but he would supplant these with forests, reservoirs,
spillways and other methods. "Judged in this light
the economic idea that flood control may be regarded
as a. by-product of the effective use of land does not
1
seem at all far-fetched."
1 American Forests and Forest Life, July 1927, p. 447

Chapter IV
The Mississippi Flood of 1927
and the Proposed Plans for its Control
by Legislation of 1928

The Mississippi Flood of 1927
and the Proposed Plans for its Control
by Legislation of 1928
The people of the Mississippi Valley have suffered
as few other peoples of the world from inundations.
They furnish one of the world’s finest illustra-
tions of man’s struggle with nature for the possession
of her natural resources. The Outlook states, ’’many
prominent engineers and many laymen feel that these
people will continue to live in jeopardy of inundation
every few years, even after all possible means of pro-
tection have been adopted.”
1
The people of the United States have known that
inundations were inevitable in the lower Mississippi
Valley yet the Great Flood of 1927 so impressed them
that it took a most prominent place in our national life
during that year.
President Hoover, who was then Secretary Hoover,
quoted: ”It is the greatest peace-time disaster in our
history. We are humble before such an outburst of the
forces of Nature and the futility of man in their control.
Heavy rains had been experienced for months through-
1 Outlook, June 8, 1927
2 Ibid
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out the Mississippi Valley during the fall of 1926
and the winter and spring months of 1926-1927. The
heavy rains fell over thirty-one states and two
Canadian provinces drained by the Great River, com-
prising an area of 1, 240,000 square miles. This rain-
fall would amount to "nearly a foot of water spread
over that vast area—that is nearly 250 cubic miles of
water. Much of this evaporated or soaked deep into
the earth, but more than 60 cubic miles of it had to
1
reach the gulf.”
The Mississippi Basin is like a giant funnel. Its
wide top stretches from New York to Montana, its sides
slope toward the gulf, getting narrower and narrower un-
til it forces all its great wraters through a spout into
the Gulf.
As the floods rose higher and higher and as the
rains continued to fall in various sections of the valley
the forecasts began to predict a record super-flood.
A super-flood signifies the largest possible deluge
that every tributary river, creek and rivulet can pour
simultaneously into the Mississippi River. It means we
have cloudbursts in Montana, a swollen Ohio River, the
Oklahoma and Texas Rivers are flooded, the Missouri,
Cumberland, Tennessee, Arkansas and Red Rivers all go
1 Great Mississippi Flood of 1327—Frederick Simpich
National Geographic, September 1927, p. 245
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TONS AND TONS OF DIRT SHOT HIGH INTO THF AIR
Fighting against the warring waters, men dynamited the levees to relieve pressure at points
upstream. In this shot 1,500 pounds of dynamite were discharged by using the hand-magneto
’’The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927”
The National Geographic, September 1327--p. 251
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raging along with their swollen torrents to reach the
Mississippi at once. Yet the upper Mississippi,
Missouri, Arkansas, White and Red Rivers may pour into
the Mississippi, the ’’Great Father of All Fivers” will
discharge all its waters, provided, the easterly rivers,
the Ohio, Cumberland, ana Tennessee keep comparatively quiet
no flood v/ill occur.
Levees had been constructed to cope with the great-
est flood prior to 1927, but they held never been planned
to withstand a flood of such magnitude. It is probable
that such a maximum flood happens about every two hundred
years. The levee line had been constructed to provide
safety from a flood slightly higher than those of 1312
ana ISIS, but it was hardly finished to that standard.
If the floods of 1927 could have been confined they would
have been ’’four feet higher than any former flood.”
By April 15, 1927 the inundation had become a
national disaster when 25,000 people were already forced
to leave their homes and lands. The Red Cross began its
work immediately. As the crest of the flood moved down
the river and as heavy rainstorms on the lower tributaries
made record heights certain, general conditions grew
more and more unfavorable, the flooded area rapidly
widened. By April 22, the number of flood refugees had
1 American Railway Engineering Association Bulletin Vol. 29
July 1927, p. 91
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reached 75,000 and was increasing very rapidly with
unfavorable forecasts and bad conditions continuing
for fighting floods.
Dismal Flooded Areas—1927
’’Now, from Arkansas to Louisiana a foul and
swirling sea, bearing on its yellow tide everything
from the offal, animals, trees, trash, fences, houses,
barns, chicken-coups, to bridges scoured down by fifty-
1
four flooded tributaries.”
From Cairo, from Little Bock, from Memphis, far
down through the lowlands, the waters persistently
broke loose.
Levees tumbled, vast areas were flooded. Swollen
bodies of mules, hogs, horses and cows glutted the
bayous. Buzzards came, on the levees the wolves preyed
on the deer tired from swimming.
Far and wide rescue steamers churned the yellow
tide, hauling bargeloads of silent, stupefied people,
coaxed and forced from. their homes and perilous retreats.
Overhead the scout planes roared, seeking out groups
marooned on levees or housetops. Then they flew back
to report, that these might be rescued by the relief
boats. On levees, ridges, ancient Indian mounds, wet,
sick, miserable, men, women and children huddled with
1 The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927—Frederick Simpich
National Geographic, September 1927, p. 248
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their domestic animals. Foxes, rabbits, quail, deer,
muskrats, wild turkeys tired and exhausted from floods
crawled upon the levees, over man’s piled-up furniture,
bedding and bundles, unmindful of men or dogs.
Steamboats cruised over wide devastated areas.
Some of the steamboats cruised fifteen feet above
favorite parks. Railroads were torn up, steel bridges
floated. Saw mills and sugar refineries, cotton gins and
box cars floated. Houses of light construction were
swept away. Large plantation houses were submerged in
water to their upper stories.
Mississippi Fiver Commission
and
Work of Relief Organizati ons
’’Sensing the enormity of the growing disasters
President Coolidge decided to take strong measures to
1
meet the needs of the situation.”
On April 22, 1927, he appointed a committee of
five Cabinet Members under the name of the Mississippi
Flood Committee to cooperate with, and to coordinate
the work of the various flood-fighting and relief or-
ganizations. The members of that committee were the
Secretaries of Treasury, War, Navy, Agriculture and
Commerce. President Hoover, who was then. Secretary
1 The Congressional Digest, February 1928, p. 42
.Ofi: - 1 :> ' j
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of Commerce, acted as Chairman of the Commission and
left immediately for the flood torn districts to take
active direction of the work. He remained constantly
/
on the job while other members of the committee joined
him from time to time. The Red Cross rescue fleet
sprang into existence over night. Here went the key
men of the Red Cross staff from all over the Union,
to work in cooperation with officers of the Army, Navy,
Public Health Service, Coast Guard, Department of
Agriculture, Veterans’ Bureau and the railroads which
served the flooded area. With radios, telephones, air-
planes, trains, boats and motor cars, where roads were
open, all grouped and guided the imperiled populations
in cities, counties and whole sections of river states
were saved from drowning. Aided by Weather Bureau pre-
dictions of the flood’s advance, there was time to warn
towns, cities and even whole counties of impending peril.
Tens and tens of thousands saved by such warnings fled
from the lowlands.
Frederick Simpich writes ’’they fled as the
Children of Israel fled through the Red Sea, driving
their livestock with them, carrying children, food,
and hastily gathered household goods. But for these warn-
ings, made possible by modern invention more lives must
have been lost in this flood than America gave to the
.-
'
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MOURNFUL BAWLING HINTED THAT EVEN COWS FEARED THE FLOODS
Too tired to frisk or “high-tail” it, sadly lowing in bovine perplexity, thousands of cattle
were rescued from the lowlands. This herd is being landed at Natchez. Many cattle marooned
on levees became so hungry that they ate empty jute bags and old newspapers.
"The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927"
The National Geographic, September 1927
—
p. 254
i
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battlefields of Europe. Yet efficient as the big
intelligent machine was, and diabolical as the great
waters were, pushing down the great broad valley,
many bewildered people either failed to get warning
1
or did not heed it."
"To find and save this helpless, hungry humanity
the huge rescue force of the Red Cross, ranging from
Navy tugs and Coast Guard cutters to commandeered
steamers, barges and fishing craft, was busy from dawn
till dark and even through the night many bigger boats
cruised on, crashing over tops of submerged trees,
steaming boldly among floating houses or up village
streets where no steamer ever cruised before, flashing
huge search-lights into the night seeking men huddled
2
here or perched there, above the evil yellow sea."
Within reach of Natchez, Red Cross workers said about
15,000 head of livestock were marooned on levees, mounds
and ridges.
The chairman of the Mississippi Flood Committee
divided the work of fighting the flood into four states:
1) The rescue of the people from their flooded homes.
2) The care of the people while in the refugee camps.
3) The reconstruction of the inundated areas,
.
S
4; Flood Prevention.
1 The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927, National Geographic,
September 1927, F. Simpich p. 250
2 Ibid
3 The Survey, July 1927, p. 357
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The first part of the fight naturally received
first consideration. Secretary Hoover and his asso-
ciates collected the greatest rescue fleet this nation
has ever known, more than one thousand power boats,
1
thousands of auxiliary craft of every description.
Economic Effects of Mississippi Flood
The vastness of this task is shown by the fact
that more than 700,000 people were driven from their
homes and had to be assembled in refugee camps or in
places where they could be cared for by the Red Cross
2
and other agencies .
The efficiency of this work is shown by the fact
that 550,000 people were actually rescued from levee
tops, trees, house tops, and other points of temporary
safety. More than 607,000 were carried to Red Cross
**
refugee camps. The actual loss in life will never be
known because of the large area inundated and the tran-
sient nature of much of the negro population of the
delta. Many human bodies were found in some sections
after the waters receded. The official reports show
1 Congressional Digest, February 1928, p. 42
2 Flood Control, Pieport to House, No. 8219, 70th Congress
1st Session, p. 10
3 Editorial Research Reports—Mississippi Flood, p. 10
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1
a total loss of life less than 250. That so many people
could have been rescued from such dangerous places
with such little loss of life is remarkable proof of
the efficiency of management.
When the officials began to check up the damages
from this inundation, their records of damages sur-
passed all those of previous ones.
The nation became aware of the meaning of Secre-
tary Hoover
1
s statement, "this flood has been the
greatest disaster of peace times in history.”
The Mississippi River Flood Control Association
collected data from the various counties and parishes
2
of the delta and published the compilation.
The report placed the Direct Property at
5$236,354,416.06. Loss of Lives 183.
The United States Weather Bureau estimated the
o
Direct Property Loss at $363,533,154.
This gigantic sum far surpassed the $78,188,000
for the flood of 1912 and $17,088,000 for 1922, which
3
were the most destructive floods prior to 1927.
Farmers, business men, and people of all walks of life
suffered severe losses. It affected far and near, rural
1 House Committee on Flood Control—House Bill No. 8219
70th Congress, p. 3
2 Mississippi River Flood Control Association—Losses
and Damages Resulting from Flood of 1927
3 Mississippi River Flood Control Association—Losses
and Damages—Flood 1927
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During the worst of the flood, the
water rose over the second Boor of
this bank building in Arkansas City.
It failed shortly after the water
receded
"Starting Business After the
Nation’s Business Sept. 1927--p.
Flood"
36 9 Graham
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districts, villages, and cities. The owners of land
suffered most in property damages; the negro tenants
most in loss of lives. In most cases the negroes
owned little except meagre household furnishings but
they lost whatever they possessed.
Yet, this huge sum as estimated does not include
many losses, direct or indirect. The Mississippi Flood
Control Association points out in just one illustration
how far the direct losses extended. The lower delta
of the Mississippi had become one of the leading fur
selling sections of the United States. Muskrats alone,
in the state of Louisiana, yielded 6,750,000 pelts
annually prior to the flood of 1927. It will be many
years, if ever, before this industry can reach its for-
mer position. The wild life of the entire lower valley
suffered tremendous losses. It has been estimated that
at least 50% of the animals of this inundated area
1
perished in the flood of 1927.
It is certain that the indirect losses totaled an
enormous sum. Perhaps they surpassed the direct losses.
Secretary Hoover estimated them at 1200,000,000. Indirect
losses extended to everyone who was in any way affected
by the influence of the flood, business men, land owners,
farmers, and laborers. Investors in securities of in-
dustries in the area, in industries closely connected
1 The Grest Mississippi Flood of 1927, Frederick Simpich
National Geographic, September 1927, p. 264
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Photograph by Stanley Clisby Arthur
A TIRED MUSKRAT RESTING IN A HALE-SUBMERGED KUSH
FLOODS TAKE HEAVY TOLL OE WILD LIFE
Caught by the rising waters, wild creatures of the lowlands, such as deer, rabbits, turkey,
and quail, fled to the levees and unafraid mingled with domestic animals. Men protected them.
"The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927"
The National Geographic Sept. 1927
—
p. 264, 269
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with the lower valley, in securities in levee boards,
in farm lands, suffered heavily in direct and indirect
losses. The divergence of the- dairy industry is like-
wise an illustration of indirect losses. Dairying had
begun to gain a foothold in the inundated area. The
flood seriously delayed its development. The injury
to an infant industry can not be estimated at the actual
value of property destroyed.
Another serious indirect loss that can not be
measured or estimated was the loss of negro labor. Many
megroes never returned to their former homes. Some sec-
tions lost as many as one third of their negroes. This
section was already feeling the increasing shortage of
farm labor. This was a serious blow to the delta people.
Judged on the basis of losses and damages it was the
super-flood of our history. It took as toll something
less than 250 lives and approximately one half billion
dollars of property value.
The Mississippi River Commission assumed charge
of the government funds to be spent in this emergency.
Federal Funds reached $6,806,574
Local Funds -1.323.070
Total $8,129,344
"Just how this huge sum for emergency expenditures
1 House Committee on Flood Control—70th Congress 1st
Session, 1927-6, Committee Document No. 1, p. 87
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became available forms an interesting example of an
illegal act that met the approval of all governmental
1
agencies, and apparently of practically all the people.”
In the spring of 1927 the Mississippi River Com-
mission had $5, 000, 000 on hand, legally it could spend
only 60$ of it because the locals could not raise their
quotas. The Commission needed to spend all the money
to repair crevasses. The President and other government
officials desired to raise still additional money from
other funds in the hands of the government. The Comp-
troller General was asked for a ruling concerning the use
of funds. He ruled, ’’that the expenditure of the
money in the hands of the Mississippi River Commission
without local contribution and the diversion of other
O
funds for purposes of flood relief would be illegal."
Then Chairman Martin B. Madden of the House Appropria-
tion Committee publicy agreed with the Mississippi River
Commission, President Cooliage and others, that the funds
ought to be illegally spent. "At the suggestion of
President Coolidge, Mr. Madden and General H. M. Loid,
Director of the Budget, conferred on what should be
done under the existing conditions. Mr. Madden then
1 Development of The Federal Program of Flood Control
A. D. Frank
2 Congressional Digest, February 1928
r6 Congressional Record, 70th Congress—1st Session, Pt. 1
1927-8, p. 212
- c . ' i
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wrote to the President expressing his willingness to
share the responsibility for using funds in a manner that
the Comptroller General had declared would be a viola-
tion of the law. He also offered to assume full re-
sponsibility for replacing these funds when Congress
met. With that understanding, the President authorized
the Secretary of War to divert $2,000,000 that had
been appropriated for river and harbor work. The
Mississippi River Commission spent $7,000,000 of Fed-
eral funds, about $4,000,000 illegally in the emergency
work caused by the flood of 1927."
1
True to his pro-
mise, Mr. Madden succeeded in securing an emergency
appropriation on December 22, 1927 of $7,000,000 to re-
place the money spent in the great emergency.
The Work of the Fed Cross
No account of the Mississippi Flood of 1927 would
be complete without a report on the work of the Red
Cross.
No other peace-time task of similar size had ever
been undertaken. To care for more than 600,000 people
by voluntary subscription seemed an impossible task.
The efficiency of the Red Cross and the generosity of
the American people was shown by the collection and wise
1 Congressional Digest, February 1928, p. 41
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“hold still, sister ! it won't hurt you !”
To prevent the outbreak of disease, all refugees arriving at Red Cross camps were required
to be immunized. Those submitting here to vaccination are “Cajuns,” as Acadians of the
Evangeline country of Louisiana are sometimes called.
"The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927"
The National Geographic, September 1927--p. 254
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expenditure of more than *17,250,000.
The Red Cross rescue fleet, with its 1,000 power
boats, and hundreds of small boats, launches and craft
took part in the rescue work. From the army, navy,
coast guard. Bureau of Lighthouses, Mississippi River
Commission, private corporations and individuals came
boats of all descriptions. From the Great Lakes to
the Gulf of Mexico and to the Atlantic Seaboard coast
guard boats poured into the cities of Memphis, Vicks-
burg, Baton Rouge, New Orleans and other river ports.
One Memphis factory built and donated fifty medium-sized
craft in a single night and had them ready for duty
1
with small motors and on the river next day. Federal
Government, State Government and private owners fur-
nished a large fleet of airplanes. Twice daily, thirty
United States planes inspected the flooded areas, fly-
ing a total of 75,000 miles. This fleet carried many
thousands of refugees to the Red Cross Camps, which were
kept under a semi-military discipline. Homeless people
were cared for in 149 refugee camps and in many public
buildings.
’’While the flood inundated the lands the maintenance
of the refugees and their livestock furnished the most
expensive and most important item. For this purpose
1 House Committee on Flood Control 70th Congress, 1st
Session, No. 8219, Report, p. 253
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RESCUE BOATS WERE RUN LIKE AN ARMY TRANSPORT FLEET
Pushing their big barges, light-draft stern-wheelers moved from town to town in the
yellow sea, or from one marooned group to another, loading and hauling people, furniture, and
livestock to safety.
The
’’The Greet Mississippi Flood of 1927”
National Geographic, September 1927
—
p. 271
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the Red Cross spent about $6,500,000 and utilized the
services of thousands of volunteer workers under the
supervision of Bed Cross workers of local authorities.
More than 800,000 head of livestock were rescued, taken
1
to refugee camps and cared for by the Red Cross."
While the problem of maintenance required more
money and more work, it soon became evident that the
danger of disease was the greater menace to the loss of
life. So long as the Red Cross workers had the refugees
under their supervision in the camps, ’where contagious
diseases could be isolated, pure water furnished and
sanitary measures could be carried out, they could con-
trol this problem. But, on returning home the refugees
became susceptible to various diseases, arising from the
germs acquired in camp, or were in the water or the un-
sanitary environment caused by the flood.
The Red Cross regarded the health work as supple-
mentary and left the main responsibility on the United
States Public Health Service and the State Boards of
Health, yet its own work cost more than $600,000. It
included the inoculation of more than 410,000 against
typhoid fever, the vaccination of 141,889 persons against
small pox and the distribution of 85,000,000 grains of
1 Congressional Digest, February 1988, p. 43
.'
'
1
quinine to combat malaria. The preventive work of
the Red Cross. even went so far as to screen the houses
of the returned refugees.
The Red Cross furnished food for people, feed for
livestock, poultry, clothing, household furnishings,
buildings, repairs, farm implements, livestock seed,
and whatever might be needed greatly by 600,000 people
for varying lengths of time at the expense of more than
1
|6 ,500,000.
1 Congressional Digest, February 1928
,, % <)C 3,0
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As the floods receded the third type of the work
as outlined by Secretary Hoover became imminent— that
of Reconstruction. Reconstruction meant to thousands
of the delta people, as the refugees returned to their
homes, that they must be sheltered, fed, cared for un-
til they could earn their own living. The destruction
of levees, crops, loss of homes, implements, livestock
and in many cases the loss of all property made some
plan of reconstruction absolutely necessary.
Creation of Agricultural Fina nce Con orations
The creation of Agricultural Finance Corporations
for the purpose of furnishing credit to the farmers
of the inundated area was an important phase of the
work
.
In addition to the restitute. Secretary Hoover
and other leaders realized that thousands of farmers
would sorely need credit, which they could not obtain
through the ordinary channels, due to the failures
and crop shortage caused by the floods. In the states
of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas, Agricultural
Finance Corporations were formed by the. bankers and
business men of the South. These business corporations
. . - L.' . .
;< •
. /
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would rediscount securities of the farmers to the ex-
1
tent of
<i : 7.50 per acre. It soon became evident that
the three state corporations did not have sufficient
capital to meet the urgent needs of the farmers. The
situation was presented to President Cooiidge by Secre-
tary Hoover. President Cooiidge requested Lewis E.
Pierson a New York banker, who had been selected by
the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, to lead
in the flood rehabilitation work, to call a conference
of business men to urge them to give their assistance
in this emergency. The bankers met in Washington with
2
Secretary Hoover in assistance.
Within one hour the bankers had formed a large
holding company called the Flood Credits Corporation
with a capital of $2,000,000. Its subscribers received
debentures against the Agricultural Finance Corporations
of Louisiana, Mississippi and Arkansas. The purpose of
the corporation was solely to strengthen the stock of
the corporations of the delta states. The additional
two million dollars in capital enabled the combination
of credit corporation to secure twelve to fifteen million
5
dollars
.
1 Commercial and Financial Chronicle, June 4, 1927, p. S301
2 The Nation’s Business Vol. 15, July 1927, p. 52
5 Ibid
—
p. 52
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The fact that big business men of other parts of
the country voluntarily risked $2, 000, 000 in this en-
terprise showed that they had faith in the success of
the plan and they felt that the problem influenced the
business conditions of the entire country.
"The immensity of the 1927 disaster was that
touch of nature which established the kinship of the
1
whole nation.” Out of this terrible calamity there
grew a widespread feeling that it should, be the last
destructive flood. The people of the country, and
especially the people of the delta, freely expressed
the hope and the opinion that the Federal Government would
take ample steps to see that the world’s greatest delta
2
would not suffer again from an inundation. Probably
no public Question in peace time ever had a more uniform
demand for quick action. No peace time disaster ever
received such widespread publicity. The very best re-
porters and writers wrote reports of the flood. Many of
5
the writers spent much time in the inundated delta.
The nation wide discussion of the gravity of such a great
flood aroused a sympathetic feeling for Federal Control.
Secretary Hoover stated: "One bright ray which comes out
1 The Survey Vol. 58 July 1, 1927, p. 277
2 Survey, July 1, 1927, p. 277
3 Literary Digest, April 14, 1928, p. 10
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of the gloomy situation confronting the Mississippi
Valley was the realization that 125,000,000 people of
the United States had been awakened to the fact that
1
this valley must be protected from future catastrophe.”
The press gave wide publicity to the results of the
survey of American Business that the United States
Chamber of Commerce conducted to determine what business
men considered the main problems confronting Congress.
The survey ranked flood control first, with taxation
2
and agricultural relief following. This was apparently
the consensus of opinion of American Business men.”
The campaign for Federal Control began with great
enthusiasm and determination while the rescue work con-
tinued as the flood waters receded. Every agency that
had played any part in securing Federal Control contri-
buted something to the great campaign of 1927. The
Mississippi Fiver Flood Control Association obtained the
services of nationally known organizations to estimate
the industrial losses. Red Cross chairmen, county and
local officials, collected a vast amount of data. The
data collected by experts and by local people were pub-
lished and given a wide distribution. After the flood of 1927
Congress was deluged by resolutions from various types of
1 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, Ft. 6, p. 4568
2 Manufacturers Record May 12, 1927, p. 63
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organizations. ”As early as May 22, 1927 while the
flood still covered large areas, forty organizations,
practically all of them national in scope, expressed
a definite demand for federal control.” ^ Such or-
ganizations as the American Farm Bureau Federation,
the American Legion, the United States Chamber of
Commerce, the American Federation of Labor, the Ameri-
can Investment Bankers Association, the American Bank-
ers Association, the Mississippi River Flood Control
Association and others sent strong representations to
2
Washington to work in behalf of legislation. Special
trains carrying men urging Federal Control again tra-
velled to Washington.
Two notable examples of the creation of public
sentiment by organized effort that should receive special
attention occurred in the work of the United States
Chamber of Commerce and in the activities of the Chicago
Flood Control Conference.
Proposals of United States Chamber of Commerce
During the period of the flood the Board of Direc-
tors of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States
appointed a special committee to study all phases of
1 New Orleans-Times
,
'lay 22, 1927, p. 9
2 Congress Record--70th Congress 1st Session, Pt. 7
19£8, p. 5547
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the problem that the committee considered ap ropriate
for Chamber action. This committee was composed of
fifteen well-known men of high rank in their various
1
professions and business. This committee made a
thorough study of the floods over a long period of
years. The committee submitted a short and painstaking
report. The Chamber of Commerce then submitted on
October 31, 1927 the following four recommendations:
1. That the Federal Government should pay the
entire cost of building and maintaining adequate flood-
control works on the lower Mississippi River.
(The vote on that proposition was 2131 in
favor of and 512 against it.)
2. That the United States should assume full re-
sponsibility for locating, constructing and maintaining
flood-control works.
(The vote of that proposition was even more
one sided, 2581 for and 240 against it.)
3. That there be three adequate appropriations,
”to insure efficient continuous, and economic work, the
2
funds to be available as needed.”
1 American Academy of Political and Social Science
—
Annals, January 1928
2 Chamber of Commerce—Special Bulletin, January 6, 1928
p. 1 Referendum No. 51
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(The vote on that proposition stood 2657| for
and 156-| against.)
4. The final recommendation stated that the Miss-
issippi River should be separated from all other pro-
jects or undertakings and dealt with by legislation
wholly on its own merits.
(The vote on this proposition was 26£9§ for and
£3l| against.)
By this overwhelming vote the Chamber of Commerce
of the United States very forcibly impressed Congress
and the public by its stand in favor of the control of
the Mississippi Floods at the Federal Expense.
Frederick Delano, Chairman of the Committee, and
other prominent members of the Committee stressed before
r
the House Committee on Flood Control "the urgent demand
and the great necessity for the United States government
to finance control on the lower Mississippi in its en-
tirety, and for the immediate beginning of the work of
1
construction.
"
1 Congressional Record, 70th Congress Pt. 6, 1st Session
p. 4567
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The Chica go Flood Control Conference
Another notable event that deserves mention was
the Chicago Flood Control Conference. While 'the 1927
flood was raging, William Hale Thompson termed the
famous, ’’Big Bill of Chicago,” went down to New Orleans
1
on what he called, a ’’Victory Pilgrimage.” His purpose
in going was to declaim to New Orleans and to all people
of the valley and to the world that Chicago was ready
to join hands in a determined effort to secure immediate
and adequate flood control at the expense of the Federal
Government. On May 6 and 7, 1927, Mayor Thompson secured
the meeting of a large number of the Members of Congress
at Peoria, Illinois. Martin B. Madden, Chairman of the
Appropriations Committee of the House, gave his coopera-
tion in this movement. Meanwhile Mayor O’ Reef e of New
Orleans, and Mayor Miller of St. Louis joined their
forces with Mayor Thompson. A general Flood Conference
was held at Chicago on June 2, 5 and 4, 1927.
To this conference came more than two thousand
people, governors, mayors, members of the House, Senators,
Cabinet Members, politicians, engineers, representatives
of business organizations and other powerful organiza-
2
tions .
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session No. 1, p. 250
2 Ibid
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At the opening "shot" of the conference Mayor Thompson
severely indicted the United States Government for per-
1
mitting the great disaster of 1927. The speakers at
this Conference consisted of many prominent men in all
lines of business and of various professions. President
Coolidge sent Dwight Davis, Secretary of War, as his
representative. The sentiment of the entire group was
unanimously in favor of Federal Control of the Mississippi
Floods
.
Secretary Davis argued that flood control was a
national problem but that the nation should first get a
workable plan that was sound in both engineering and
economic aspects. As was to be expected, there appeared
differences as to the nature of the plan and some criti-
cism of the work of the Mississippi River Commission and
of Congress.
Mayor Thompson’s program was carried out as he had
planned. He had the finest reporters from all the impor-
tant news gathering agencies present in readiness to give
the public all proceeding of the Conference in favor of
Federal Control. One may justly state that the Chicago
Conference represented Mayor Thompson’s greatest triumph.
Representative J. J. Cochran of Missouri stated that it
1 New York Times, June 5, 1927, p. 9 Pt . I
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was a meeting of a mutual admiration society."
No one can actually say how much influence the
Chicago Conference had, but it was doubtless an im-
portant factor in formulating public opinion. Sev-
eral members of Congress established themselves as
strong supporters of Federal Control. Through the
speech of Secretary Davis, President Coolidge went on
record also in favor of control by the United States
Government. Much education came from the conference.
Most of the country had remained "marvelously ignorant"
on the subject in spite of the efforts of the valley
people to get their problem before the public.
The Chicago Conference requested President Coolidge
to call a nation wide conference of army engineers,
civil engineers, conservationists, geologists, financiers
and other experts to "formulate a policy of flood pre-
1
vention in a broad and comprehensive way." They stated
that it was the nation* s duty to "attack the flood pro-
blem." Trey declared it was the responsibility of the
Federal Government to Control the Mississippi as no other
agency could adequately solve the problem. That addi-
tional means besides levees would have to be instigated.
1 Manufacturers Record, July 21, 1927, p. 83
2 Ibid—June 9, 1927, p. 59
3 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, Bill 8219
—
p. 5
•.
*
The resolutions submitted no definite plan of control
but a comprehensive plan was suggested.
109
These proposals coming from a diverse group of
eminent men were submitted to President Coolidge on
June 10, 1927 and apparently were received favorably
by him. The great campaign continued until it seemed
that Congress had never received a more universal de-
mand on any question than it had in the demand for im-
mediate and adequate action to control floods of the
1
Mississippi .
Secretary Hoover stated: ”1 believe the whole of
the United States is unanimous in that we must under-
take such engineering works as will give security not
2
only now but for the future.’
1
Controversy over a Special Session of Congress
The question of a special session of Congress to
enact flood control legislation became one of great
controversy as the campaign for federal control continued.
Public interest in preventing flood control always de-
creased as the space of time continued after every disas-
1 House Committee on Flood Control—70th Congress 1st
Session Bill No. 8219—p. 5
2 Annals of American Academy—Political and Social Science
January 1928, p. 16
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ter. Because of this decreased public interest, many
friends of flood control desired a special session so
that they could present the question to Congress while
public enthusiasm was at its height.
. Many people felt that this problem justified a
special session. Accordingly they followed the usual
procedure and began to besiege their representatives
in Congress. Senator Reed of Missouri proved to be a
hard fighter. He sent a telegram to every member of
Congress urging the special session. Senator B. D.
McRellar of Tennessee also urged a special session and
1
several other senators joined him.
f,To those who wanted the special session, it seemed
that President Coolidge had determined to have Congress
in session as little as possible and that he would not
heed the demand of a large majority of American people.”
President Coolidge continued, however, to call the
special session. Several members of Congress defended
Mm, others attacked him for his stand. Much of the
KJ
press of the country defended him.
Even the press of the delta region defended his
position. According to the New York. Times, a majority
1 United States Daily, May 17, 1927, p. 1
2 Manufacturers Record, A.ugust 4, 1927, p. 79
2 New Orleans Times, May 19, 1927
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of the bankers, security owners, scientists and en-
1
gineers of the delta region opposed a special session.
They claimed that a special session for flood control
would cause wrangling and controversies on many sub-
jects, the results of which would be of doubtful ad-
vantage even to flood control legislation. They fur-
ther maintained that another flood in 1928 was very un-
likely, and that even if one should come a special session
could do little to control it. This was in rebuttal
to the main argument of those who favored the special
session. This argument was that the work of rebuilding
the levees should be done before or during the winter
of 1927-1928 to meet the possible danger of another
2
great flood in the spring of 1928.
Then, the strongest argument against the special
session maintained that the 1927 flood had made new en-
gineering plans an absolute necessity. This situation
meant that the engineers would have to have several
months in which to -study the problem before they could
spend any money which Congress might appropriate.
The result came finally to a compromise. Senator
Joseph Robinson of Arkansas and Senator Charles Curtis
of Kansas agreed that perhaps the wise thing to do was
1 United States Daily, May 5, 1927 p. 1
2 Commerce and Finance, May 11, 1927, p. 958
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to call a Congressional Committee together for an ex-
tensive investigation before the time for the regular
session of Congress, so that when Congress met at the
fixed time the committee would have a definite project
to present, which would enable an early action by Con-
gress .
Investigations by the Congressional
Committee on Flood Control
While the flood was still raging President Coolidge
called on the Mississippi River Commission for a report
on the special problems that would need to be solved
as a part of the comprehensive plan for Control of the
Mississippi Floods. He also called for a similar re-
port from the Chief of Engineers of the United States
Army. The Secretary of War directed the Mississippi
River Commission to hold public hearings at New Orleans,
1
Vicksburg, Memphis, and St. Louis.
Many leaders of all classes of the South appeared
as witnesses.
The Flood Control Committee of ,the House of Repre-
sentatives with Frank R. Reid as chairman, met on Novem-
ber 7, 1927 for hearings on the problem. This was one
of the most extensive investigations ever held by a
1 House Committee on Flood Control—70th Congress, 1st
Session 1927-1928, No. I, p. 1
.,
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Congressional Committee. The Committee was in session
sixty-three days. More than three hundred witnesses
appeared before it, and more than five thousand pages
1
of testimony were taken. Chairman Reid soon indica-
ted that he thoroughly understood the immensity of the
problem before the committee in planning for the great-
est piece of internal improvement in all our history.
Chairman Reid stated that it was doubtful whether so
many prominent men had ever attended hearings or given
testimony on a single national problem.
As a result of that extensive investigation by the
House Flood Committee, the work of the Mississippi
River Commission and the Corps of Engineers, Congress
had an abundance of official reports and materials at
its disposal. Public opinion and the official state-
ments from the President down left little doubt about
the Enactment of Flood Control by Congress.
1 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session Pt. 6
1928, p. 4026
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Nature of Plans for Flood Control
The next great step to be taken was the decision
as to the nature of the plan for Flood Control.
More than three hundred plans were presented to
the committee.
1
The advocates of spillways, reser-
voirs, levees, comprehensive including the Mississippi,
the Pittsburg, the Ohio and various tributaries, the
combination plans of control all had their arguments.
The Mississippi River Commission took a definite
stand for protection against a super-flood; the great-
est probable flood that might occur; a flood 25% great-
er than that of 1927. The feeling generally prevailed
among the governmental officials that no one could solve
the problem without prolonged study under actual condi-
tions. Since only the Mississippi River Commission and
the Army Engineers had had such experience, the plans
for the new project could be expected to come from them.
Although -more than three hundred plans were submitted
only two received serious consideration. One of them
came from the Mississippi River Commission; the other
from the Chief of Engineers of the United States Array.
The plan submitted by the Mississippi River Commission
1 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session Pt. 8,
1928—p. 5855
2 Saturday Evening Post, July 9, 1927 p. 108
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is called the Commission Plan, that submitted by the
Chief of Engineers of the United States Army is termed
the Jadwin Plan.
The Mississippi River Commissi on Plan
The Mississippi River Commission Plan discarded
the policy of levees only and drew up a comprehensive
plan. Levees still provided the major means of pro-
tection. The Commission based its plan on the cul-
mination of maximum discharges of the various tribu-
taries of the Mississippi. It estimated that such a
super-flood would be approximately twenty-five percent
1
greater than the flood of 1927, This estimate sug-
gested a possible flood of 2,250,000 second-feet at
Cairo and 2,850,000 second-feet at Arkansas City. This
plan submitted by the Commission was comprehensive and
provided for complete protection against a super-flood.
The following are the lines of defense recommended:
1 A Levee System
This levee system should provide a free-board
safety margin of five feet above the estimated greatest
flood possible. This would be approximately twelve
feet above the flood of 1927, with a greatly increased
1 House Committee on ’’lood Control—70th Congress, 1st
Session 1927-8, No. I p. 48
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cross section of ”1 on 4 on river side and 1 on 4 to
1
1 on 62" on land side with a crovm of twelve feet."
2 Diversion Channels
a) This plan of protection for a diversion channel
at Cypress Creek to carry 600,000 second feet of water.
b) A diversion channel through the Atchafalaya
River to carry 1,000,000 second feet.
c) Spillways at Bonne Carre and Caernavon to carry
250,000 second feet each:
These outlets were expected to reduce the flow past
New Orleans to 1,400,000 second feet and to reduce flood
2
heights at New Orleans to a maximum of 20 feet.
5 Safety-Valve Spillways
These safety-valve spillways were recommended to
prevent the overtopping or breaking of levees, possibly
by diversion through the St. Francis Basin, and possibly
<6
by reservoirs in the White and Arkansas River Basins.
These features should require intensive study and
should await a thorough economic survey that should pre-
1 House Committee on Flood Control—70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-8, December No. II p. 1
2 Ibid
5 Congressional Digest, February 1928, p. 49
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"The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927"
The National Geographic, September 1927
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cede an undertaking of such magnitude.
4 Stabilization of Channels
This plan of protection provided for the sta-
bilization of the channel and the protection of the
levees. It necessitated extensive dredging operation
1
and revetment of the banks at a cost of $>172,000,000.
This plan was divided into two parts. The first part
was designated as the essential feature. It included
the increase in levee height and section, the spillway
at Bonne Carre above New Orleans and the channel sta-
bilization works. This part of the plan was recommend-
ed for immediate adoption. The cost was estimated at
$>407,500,000. ' The Committee recommended that the
other features wait, as it required long and patient
study and an economic survey. If adopted it would raise
the total cost of production to $775,000,000.
The Commission plan provided for the payment of
all damages and the purchase of rights of ways and flow-
age rights for floodways. It provided for ample levees
to confine the waters to the proposed diversion channels
S
and to tributaries affected by the Mississippi Floods.
1 Congressional Digest, February 1928, p. 49
2 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-8, Bill No. 8219, p. 74
£ Ibid—
2
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This plan called for the expenditure of #25,000,000
1
the first year and #40,000,000 annually thereafter.
Local interests would pay one third of the cost
of raising the levees to the 1914 Mississippi River
Commission grade. This part of the cost was estima-
ted at #15,440,367.
The Federal Government would bear the remaining
expense, which included two thirds of the cost up to
the 1914 grade, all the levee cost above the 1914 grade,
all the cost of dredging and revetment, and all diver-
2
sion channel and spillway costs and damages.
1 Congressional Digest, February 1928, p. 70
2 House Committee on Flood Control—Document No. II
p. 2
-.
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The Jadwin Plan
The Jadwin plan presented much of the fundamental
principles of the Commission Plan. It likewise, was
drawn to provide against the greatest estimated super-
flood.
It provided for:
1 Levees
The raising of levees slightly above the grade
of the estimated super-flood, instead of the five feet
proposed by the Mississippi River Commission.
2 Diversion Channels
a) Diversion of 900,000 second feet through Cypress
Creek, and b) diversion of 1,500,000 second feet through
the Atchafalaya as compared to 600,000 and 1,000,000 re-
spectively by the Mississippi River Commission.
3 Spillway at Bonne Carre
Spillway of 250,000 second feet at Bonne Carre, but
not one at Caernarvon.
Here the similarity of the two plans in engineering
features ended.
The Jadwin Plan further provided:
“.
*
•
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4 Riverside Floodway
This riverside floodway seventy miles long should
extend from Bird’s Point, Missouri to New Madrid,
Missouri. This floodway was very largely for the pro-
tection of Cairo, Illinois. The present river bank
levee would be lowered five feet between these points.
Then, five miles back a higher and stronger levee
would be built to protect against the great floods that
would overtop the river bank levee. This area between
the two levees would be built so as to form a huge stor-
age basin, or create a riverside floodway.
5 Fuse Plug Sections in Levees
This Jadwin plan further proposed to build fuse-
plug sections in the levees just above Mew Madrid,
Missouri in' the vicinity of Arkansas City and on both
sides of the Atchafalaya at its head.
This meant purposely weakened sections designed to
break, at a point three feet below the top of the new
grade proposed by the plan, before the levee in general
2
was threatened.
Thus, the Jadwin plan provided to send diverted
water through uncontrolled outlets into virtually un-
1 louse Document, No. 90, 70th Congress, 1st Session
1927-8, p. 28
2 Ibid
—
p. 29
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controlled diversion channels, whereas the Commission
plan provided controlled concrete spillways to send
water into protected diversion channels. ^
The cost of the Jadwin plan of control was es-
2
timated at $296,400,000. The Jadwin plan contained
no provision for the payment of damages, fTowage rights
or for building levees in and along the floodways. This
fact accounts for the striking difference in the es-
timate of the costs of the Cypress Creek diversion channel.
The Jadwin plan placed the cost of this protection
at $7,700,000 while the Mississippi River Commission
3
placed it at $107,000,000. The Jadwin plan argued
for not paying damage for floodway rights that the flood-
ways were the natural outlets that had been appropriated
by man, who must suffer the damages imposed on him when
the flood waters turned against him.
This plan recommended the expenditure of $25,000,000
the first year, and $30,000,000 annually for nine years
4
thereafter.
The Federal Government would pay all cost of revet-
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, Bill No. 8219, p. 82
2 House Document, No. 90, 70th Congress, 1st Session
1927-8, p. 32
3 Ibid—1 No. 8, p. 2
4 Ibid—3 No. 11, p. 36
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merit and four fifths of the cost of flood control works,
with the exception of special levees which would be
built on a fifty-fifty basis. All other costs and damages
would be borne by the local interests. Special levees
were provided for the purpose of protecting populous
centres by enclosing them wholly or partially by en-
circling embankments. The Jadwin plan did not provide
alternatives in the way of other diversions and reser-
voirs as the Mississippi River Commission plan did.
Develo pment of Friction in Presentation of P lans
In the presentation of these plans friction developed
between the Mississippi River Commission and the Chief
of the Engineers. The Commissio.i felt that its dignity
had been offended by the Chief of the Engineers when he
failed to present its plan to the Flood Control Committee
of the House. All official reports had to pass through
the hands of the Chief of Engineers. General Jadwin
simply withheld the report containing the Commission
Plan until he received a request for it from the House
Committee. The Commission thought General jadwin had
usurped its power by submitting his plan.
The Committee on Flood Control had nothing to do
but to consider the Jadwin plan because it had been sub-
mitted directly by President Coolidge after it had re-
-.
^
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ceivea the approval of Secretary of War, Davis.
Differences Concerning the Two Plans
Naturally, serious differences of opinion arose
concerning these two plans and the proper legislation.
These differences were of three classes:
1) Concerning the Engineering Features of the
Plan
2) Administrative Features of the Proposed
Legislation
3) Economic Phases of the Problem
Engineering Features
There was little doubt but that the engineers
could draw up a plan and agree upon it more readily
than would Congress and the public accept it, after
it had been formulated. The differences in opinion
generally concerned the objections to the Jadwin Plan.
These objections were:
1) The uncontrolled waterways was the engineer-
ing feature most severely criticized.
J. E. Kemper, Civil Engineer, stating the
case for New Orleans claimed that n the Jadwin plan
would inundate one million acres of land, 250 miles
of railway, 400 miles of highway and several towns.
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and would completely cut New Orleans off from the West.”
2) The second point of criticism of the engineer-
ing phases of the plan was the matter of fuse-plug levees
Great fear was expressed of serious difficulties arising
from an uncontrolled mass of water flowing through a
crevasse made in a chosen place. Crevasses in the past,
have dug out great lakes, new channels and deposited
large quantities of sand. No one could predict how much
water might flow through crevasses.
3) The third objection advanced was concerning the
river-side floodway between Bird’s Point and New Madrid,
Missouri for the protection of Cairo, Illinois.
It was claimed that the return of the water at New
Madrid would cause a piling up which would reduce the
slope and velocity of the river and therefore the carry-
ing power. This reduction in volume of discharge would
fail to relieve Cairo, although 144,000 acres of fine
2
land would have been inundated by the new floodway.
The fact that this floodway afforded protection was off-
set by the argument that it was inadequate to insure pro-
tection.
Naturally, other criticisms were ma.de including the
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1327-6, December, No. 10, p. 1
2 Ibid—No. 22, p. 7
.
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general one that the whole plan was based on insufficient
data. Hearings of the engineers proved that approximately
ninety-five percent of the witnesses had some criticism
of the Jadwin Plan as an engineering project.
Administrative Features
Two phases of the administrative problem caused
discussion and disagreement.
Conflict between State and Federal Authority
1) The question of a conflict between state and
federal authority received some attention. The Jadwin
report suggested that ,Tthe states should be required
to enact appropriate legislation for accepting the
conditions and responsibilities of the act before any
money should be spent within their borders, unless the
absence of such legislation would delay the initiation
of work of far reaching benefit, specially where another
1
state was concerned.
"Senator William Lorimer wondered how Missouri
would feel about paying heavy damages for protecting
Cairo in Illinois, when the Governor, the A.ttorney
General, and members of Congress asserted Missouri would
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-8, Document 13, p. 9
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not pay for Cairo* s protection."
This topic never received much attention as
the states of the delta had concluded that they were
ready to cooperate heartily in any reasonable plan.
Const j tution of an Agency
2) Another administrative problem of great
importance was the formation of an agency that would
be able to carry out the problem to be adopted.
The Mississippi River Commission had been
the agency that had carried out the former programs
for flood control. But the Commission had been severe-
ly criticized during the flood of 1827 and since then.
The Commission Plan said nothing about the Agency of
Administration, which of course, meant that the Com-
mission expected to continue to administer.
The Jadwin plan foresaw great evils and in-
efficiency in the administration by a board. It was
suggested that the program should be administered by
the Chief of Engineers with the Mississippi River Com-
mission serving in an advisory capacity, maintaining
that the "United States Government and Corporations were
2
efficiently managed because they had one-man governments."
1 Flood Control on Mississippi River—A. D. Frank, p. 230
2 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Pt. 5
1928, p. <5571
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The domim tion by the Corps of Engineers brought
forth much criticism of the Commission.
Magazine writers and newspaper correspondents
urged reform of the agency of administration. Members
of Congress took up the criticism. The opponents of
the Mississippi River Commission and of the Corps of
Engineers could, not agree on any type of agency or com-
mission. Some suggested an independent agency similar
to the Interstate Commerce Commission. Others favored
a board composed of various Members of the Cabinet.
Still others wanted a commission that would contain
experts on all methods of flood control and that. would
be dominated by civilians. Representative G. E. Camp-
bell of Pennsylvania proposed a commission of thirteen.
Three from Corps of Engineers, Six Civilian Engineers,
and Four Business Men.
The Reid Bill
The Reid Bill then was brought before the House.
1) The Reid Bill sponsored the Commission Plan.
2) It provided for the abolishment of the Miss-
issippi River Commission.
3) Substitution of the Mississippi River Com-
mission by the Mississippi Valley Flood Control Com-
mission. Its members should be seven in number, four
'sv io 0320 C aoo bn .ic a s
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1
of whom should he engineers, either army or civilian.
Economics Aspects of the Problem
The activities of Congress had not gone very far
until it became apparent that the main fight over the
proposed legislation would centre around the economic
aspects of the problem, and not on the engineering or
administrative phases of the problem.
Two bills had appeared concerning which the fac-
tions centered their arguments:
House of Representatives Bill No. 8219, known as
the Reid Bill, had come from the Flood Control Committee
with a strong favorable majority report.
Senate Bill No. 8740, called the Jones Bill, had
come from the Senate Committee on Commerce.
The House Bill represented the views very largely
on the Mississippi River Commission plan, the Senate
Bill accepted most of the Jadwin plan. Both bills, how-
ever, failed to follow either plan on some important
economic points.
The first controversy in considering the economic
phase of the problem arose in trying to decide how much
money must be provided for the project.
The Jadwin ^lan had proposed the least, with an
1 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, o. 8
1928, p. 5854
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1
estimate of $296,400,000.
The Mississippi River Commission plan had pro-
posed the expenditure of $407,500,000 for the immediate
project and $775,000,000 for the comprehensive project.
The Jones Bill provided for the expenditure by
the United States of $525,000,000.
The Reicl Bill called for the expenditure of
3
$475,000,000.
The Jones bill provided for surveys which might
lead to great additional costs. After much debate
Senator Wesley L. Jones of Washington, author of the
Senate Bill seemed to ’’hit the nail on the head” when
he stated that Congress would be compelled from time to
time to appropriate the amounts necessary to carry out
this program for no group of engineers, or Congressiren,
could work out a plan for a solution of such a colossal
problem extending over a period of ten years so that
the estimates of the ultimate cost would approximate
correctness
.
1 House Document, No. 90, 70th Congress, 1st Session
1927-8, p. 32
2 House Committee on Flood Control, 70tb Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-8, Bill No. 8219— p. 74
3 Ibid— p. 128
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Damages
.
the Second Controversia l
Point on an Economic Phase
The second controversial point on an economic
phase appeared in the consideration of damages that
would result from the floodway s that would carry the
waters diverted from the main river. The areas in
the proposed floodways contained more than 100,000
1
people and approximately 3,000,000 acres of land.
These floodways would inundate large areas of agri-
cultural lands, much railway trackage, several towns
and whole communities. Furthermore, the Jadwin plan
proposed no payment for damages to these areas, on the
ground that the floodways were originally natural over-
flow channels that had been appropriated by man, who
2in turn had always been subjected to river floods.
The Commission Plan, on the other hand, proposed
to pay damages in full. The Commission argued that the
floodways offered more benefits to other states than
to the territory adjacent to them. Therefore, Louisiana
should not bear the burden of protecting Mississippi and
other states. Then there arose the question of confis-
cation of private property. General Jadwin* s proposal
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927, Bill No. 8219, p. 82
2 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Pt. 8
1928, p. 3888
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to let the states meet the bill aid not satisfy
the opinions of many Congressmen and laymen.
One point that caused very bitter strife arose
in connection with regard to paying the railways for
raising tracks and relocating. The Commission plan
provided for paying the railways for changes made
1
necessary by the proposed programs.
The Jadwin plan which had the support of the ad-
ministration, did not provide for paying any such
damages.
The railways estimated their damages of the ex-
2
pense which was being forced upon them, as $71,835,000.
Other private property interests for whom, no damages
were provided rushed to the aid of the railways and
the fight became heated.
Discussion arose over the method of paying for the
protective works. Those active in politics desired
bonds, even the Mississippi River Flood Control Associa-
tion supported a bond issue. Those who favored payment
3
out of current revenues stood firmly against bonds.
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-8, No. 11, p. 24
2 Ibid—p. 8 No. 23
3 House Committee on Flood Control, Hearings 1927, p. 443
.
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The greatest point of controversy developed in
considering what part of the expense of the program
should be paid by the Federal Government. Those who
favored entire payment from the federal, funds far
surpassed in numbers those who favored local partici-
pation. With the exception of the army engineers,
practically all three hundred witnesses urged that the
United States should pay the whole cost. ^
Strongest Argument for Federal Control
Many of the problems, were interstate. The weak
local districts could not furnish their quotas of funds.
The strongest argument for the Federal Government bear-
ing all the cost was based on the poor financial condi-
tion of the various levee boards and the heavy sacrifices
which they had already made to protect themselves.
The total indebtedness of the levee districts on January
2
1, 1928 was $819,642,576 . This vast amount far ex-
ceeded the assessed valuation of the districts. Some
districts had outstanding public bonds and real-estate
mortgages for more than tw^o hundred percent of their
1 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session,
Pt. 8, 1928, p. 6159
2 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-8, Bill No. 8219, p. 27
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assessed valuation. Of this large total only about
$44,000,000 had been spent fighting floods. The
larger part of the vast debts had been accumulated
through drainage and general improvements . The flood
of 1987 dealt the levee boards a staggering blow.
They had burdened themselves with all kinds of taxes
and it was an impossibility for the people to pay more.
Abundance of expert opinion stated that the
majority of the land owners could not secure loans from
any source. The very districts that needed the protec-
tion were those unable to procure loans. Investment
bankers who handled the levee-board bonds stated that
heavy defaults in these securities had depressed the
8
market until they could not be sold.
Secretary Hoover joined those who believed that
the locals could pay no more and urged the Federal
3
Government to pay all.
Such facts led most Congressmen to believe that it
was an absolute impossibility for the local levee boards
to bear further expense, than their expenses of rehabili-
tation.
1 Mississippi Biver Flood Control Association, Losses
and Damages from Flood of 1987, p. 195
8 Memphis Commercial Appeal, November 30, 1988
3 Commerce and Finance, July 87, 1987, p. 149.5
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The delta people were greatly disappointed in
the two plans which Congress was seriously consider-
ing. The Jadwin plan suggested that the Federal
government pay all cost of channel stabilization and
eighty percent of the cost of construction of protec-
tive works and that the locals furnish the rights of
way, pay damages from floodway s and twenty percent of
1
the cost of construction of protective works.
The Commission plan provided for the locals to
furnish rights of way and to pay one third of the
2
cost of raising the levees to 1914 standard. The
Commission plan, therefore left much less of the bur-
den to local interests.
Those who supported local contribution argued that
if the Federal Government paid the whole cost it might
tend to cause it to have n to pay for every project such
3
as reclamation.” The Mississippi River Commission in-
sisted on local control for the reason that it held
that locals received special benefits, and secondly, of
the belief that without a local sharing in the costs.
1 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session,
1927, 1928, Pt. 3, p. 5848
2 House Committee on Flood Control, Document No. 1
70th Congress, 1st Session, P. 81
3 New York Times, January 24, 1928, p. 29
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the Commission as an agent of the Federal Government,
disbursing Federal Funds, would "be confronted by
inordinate demands for flood control work not needed
1
nor justified."
Attitude of President Coolidge
President Coolidge threw a bomb of consternation
into the camp of the delta people when he stood for
the Jadwin plan, with local contributions and all.
The president maintained in submitting the Jadwin plan
to Congress, that the people of the delta would receive
soecial benefits and that the states should share the
2
expense. He strongly opposed paying damages caused
by the construction of flood control works. It soon
became evident that a large majority of both houses of
Congress stood in favor of the Federal Government bear-
ing the entire expense, while President Coolidge, the
army engineers and a few administration leaders demand-
ed local contribution.
The House bill sponsored the Commission plan in
general, the Senate bill sponsored the Jadwin plan, but
3
neither bill pleased the administration. The Jones bill
1 House Committee on Flood Control, 70th Congress, 1st
Session, 1927-8,—Document No. I, p. 81
2 House Document, No. 90, 70th Congress, 1st Sess. 1927-8, p. 2
3 Congressional Record, 70th Cong. 1st Sess. Pt. 8 p. 6162
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suited the President far better than the Reid bill,
but the President criticized it because it provided for
no local contribution.
As time went on it became evident that so compre-
hensive a plan as that proposed by the Mississippi
River Commission would not meet with the President’s
approval.
Meanwhile the delta became alarmed with the possi-
bility of a political issue. They wanted flood control
1
to be considered wholly on its own merits.
Republican members of Congress demanded that the
Democrats cease to play politics with the revenue bill
by demanding big cuts, and to insinuate that retalia-
tions might arise. The matter became even more serious
when members of Congress showed resentment against the
President’s interference in legislation by a threat of
2
veto
.
The delta people feared that the President’s veto
might kill any measure that had been proposed. They
then began to desert the Reid Bill and support the Jones
Bill, which very largely carried out the Jadwin plan.
In March 1928, the Tri-State Flood Control Committee,
consisting of powerful representatives from Louisiana,
1 New York Times, November 27, 1927
2 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Pt. 10
1928, p. 7319
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Mississippi and Arkansas urged the immediate passage
of the Jones Bill.
The Committee accepted the bill in principle but
suggested some amendments to provide for controlled
spillways, so that the bill would clearly provide for
compensation for property damages from protective works
and to state clearly that n jurisdiction of the Mississippi
River Commission on tributaries would not be curtailed.”
When the leaders for Federal Control began to show
a tendency to accept most of the Jadwin plan, compromise
became evident.
The President won his point against:
1) Paying compensation to the railways for damage
2in the floodways.
2) Provision for the furnishing of the local rights-
of-way on the main river.
3) To a certain extent he won the adoption of the
Jadwin plan as opposed to the Commission plan.
The Jones bill adopted the engineering features
of the Jadwin plan.
The supporters of the Commission received some con-
solation in the creation of a board consisting of the
1 Memphis Commercial Appeal, March 16, 1928
2 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Session, Pt. 10
1928, p. 7295
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Chief of Engineers, the President of the Mississippi River
Commission and one civil engineer to be appointed by the
President, to consider the engineering features of the Com-
mission plan and of the Jadwin plan with the authority to
adopt the best features of both plans.
President Coolidge yielded his point in regard to an
estimate of the final cost and allowed the bill to go through
with provisions that opened the way for huge projects. Pres-
ident Coolidge held out in regard to local contributions.
The bill was drawn up to declare that the principle of local
contribution was sound and that it had not been abandoned.
But in view of the fact that the local interests had already
paid $292,000,000 for flood protection, whereas the Federal
Government had paid only $71,000,000 the United States would
comply with the principle of bearing its just share by bear-
2
ing the whole expense of the new project.
The army engineers were satisfied because it left the
Mississippi River Commission in charge and left the Corps
still in a position to dominate.
Thus the Jones-Reid bill, as the amended bill was known
speedily passed the Senate and the House by overwhelming
votes .
President Coolidge approved it on May 15, 1928.
1 Congressional Record, 70th Congress, 1st Sess. Pt. 10 p. 7316
2 Congress of United States, Pub. Doc. Ho. 391, 70th Congress,
1st Session, 1328
- V •
.1 ' 0 ‘O
00 i 1 t . :• 9
*
. s 0 u tc t . 0 J id 'i/,0 £
.
i ; Jt-
•
.
. '^I-ilLOO
'
'
. . ;
.
i = 1
.
j
( j . d ;
V
Chapter V
Results of the Jones-Reid Act
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Results of the Jones -Reid Act
The people of the delta showed great enthusiasm
over the enactment of the Jones-Reid Act. The New
Orleans Times -Picayune stated, "that in time the ac-
complishment of the flood control program would be
accounted by history as almost as epochal as the
Louisiana Purchase.”
The Memphis Commercial Appeal printed an article
painted by Robert Ellis, Vice President of the Cham-
ber of Commerce of -the United States declaring that
the flood control legislation would have a far reach-
ing effect. "The Great Father of Waters has at last
2
found its master.”
Real estate men considered the Jones-Reid Bill
the greatest piece of legislation that ever came be-
fore a peace time Congress, that the enactment of this
bill would carry the delta area on a long period of
prosperity and that the valuation of delta lands would
be greatly increased. All along the valley the people
showed a revived spirit as they felt they would never
be called upon to make such sacrifices as they had made
during the great disaster of 1927.
1 New Orleans-Times-Picayune, May 16, 1928, p. 10
2 Memphis Commercial Appeal, May 17, 1928
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Two appropriations had been made that bore
directly on flood control before the passage of the
Jones-Reid bill. On December 22, 1327 a deficiency
appropriation measure was enacted to restore the
$7,000,000 that the Mississippi River Commission had
spent in emergency work during and following the flood
1
of 1327.
Twro million dollars reverted to the War Depart-
ment to replace funds diverted from allotments for
works on rivers and harbors, and the remainder became
available for the rise of the Mississippi River Com-
mission for the construction of protective works.
January 16, 1928 another lav; was enacted that dealt
with the rehabitation program. The county agricultural
extension agents were paid principally by the various
counties in which they were employed. The county
treasuries were so depleted by the flood of 1927 that
they could not meet their shares of expenses. The
Federal government appropriated $500,000 to carry on
the v/ork because it felt that the activities of these
agents formed a valuable part of the program of recon-
struction.
1 Congressional Digest, February 1328, p. 41
2 Ibid
.8
.
The funds necessary to meet the provisions of the
Jones-Reid Act for the year 1928-1929 were provided
by an appropriation of $24,000,000 of which Secre-
tary of Wgr, Davis allotted $21,228,000 for immediate
use, ^ The Mississippi River Commission then had
sufficient funds for the rapid construction of levees
and the carrying out of the other provision of the act.
An important change occurred in the personnel of
the Mississippi River Commission in June 1928. During
the hearings preceding the enactment of the Jones-Reid
bill Colonel Charles L. Potter as President of the
Commission had presented a much more comprehensive
plan of control than Gen ral Edgar Jad?/in, the Chief
of the United States Army engineers had submitted.
Both men had criticized the other’s plan. Naturally,
it was not a surprise to have Colonel Potter succeeded
by Colonel T. H. Jackson as President of the Mississippi
River Commission. The people of the delta seemed pleased
with this change as Colonel Jackson was regarded very
highly by them. Reorganization of the Commission took
place to meet the new conditions. Formerly the Com-
mission had designated certain members as officers in
charge of work in given districts. In November 1928
the direction of the program was turned over to one man
1 Congressional Digest, February 1928, p. 41
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as Director of the Flood Control Project. Major
1
Paul S. Reinecke became the first director. This
change left the work under the Commission but placed
one man in charge of the entire program instead of
several individuals, each in his own district as for-
merly.
The supporters of the Commission’s plan forced
through a clause in the Jones-Reid Act providing that
the Flood Control Board should adjust the engineering
differences between the two plans by adopting or re-
2
jecting features of either plan.
The composition of the board received considerable
criticism. The board consisted of General Edgar Jadwin,
the Chief of the United States Army Engineers, Colonel
T. H. Jackson, the President of the Tiississippi River
Commission and C. W. Sturtevant of New York, a civilian
engineer appointed by President Coolidge. The Board
formulated its plan and prepared its report in August
1928. President Coolidge approved it and it was made
public by the Department of War, August 16, 1928. The
Jadwin plan had been unanimously adopted in practically
all its details.
The following sketch as portrayed by Harris Dickson
1 World Almanac, 1929, p. 160
2 Memphis, Commercial Appeal, April 25, 1928
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gives an idea of the work to be accomplished under the
1
act of August 16, 1928.
The Jadwin Plan
Beginning at the northern limit of our alluvial
valley from Cape Guardeau, Missouri, the levees will
be gradually raised to two feet at Bird’s Point, the
head of a floodway that will be provided immediately
below Cairo, Illinois to protect that city and its
15,000 inhabitants. It is in this stretch of river
that existing levees seem to choke- the channel and
have a tendency to make the waters pile up.
Cairo will be inclosed by a levee rising sixty
feet on the gauge. Portions of that city now lie
twenty feet below this level. A maximum flood may
climb to 65.5 feet if confined, but the water will not
be confined, for when the stage reaches fifty-five
feet it spills into this floodway and is carried off.
For that purpose a new set back levee is to be
constructed from Bird’s Point to New Madrid, Missouri
at an average distance of five miles from the river.
This space between the new line and the old forms the
floodway, seventy miles long as the river runs. The
front levees remain, but are cut down five feet lower
1 Keeping the Father of Waters in the Straight and Narrow
Path, Saturday Evening Post, November 3, 1928, p, 52
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than those at the rear. So this weaker front must
break while that at Cairo still holds, and the basin
will restrict a super-flood to fifty-nine feet on the
Cairo gauge. In 1927 the most phenomenal overflow
for 200 years produced a crest at Cairo of 56.4 with-
out mishap. Under present handling an equal inunda-
tion would cause a stage of 55.5 for a short time only.
In addition to saving Cairo, this work at New
Madrid renders the whole St. Francis Basin less liable
to accidental crevasse. Even such lands as lie within
the floodway can be cultivated through every season,
except when water rises higher than the crest of 1922.
South of New Madrid the levees will be raised one
foot above the super-flood, except opposite the back-
water areas of the St. Francis and White Rivers.
Nov/ we come to the middle river from the Arkansas
to the Red River. The Arkansas v/as the terror of 1927.
Into the Mississippi already gorged with waters, the
Arkansas emptied another load of more than three times
as heavy as Niagara Falls.
Just above the Arkansas, the White River had pre-
viously donated one Niagara and a half.
These resistless reenforcements burst through our
defense on the east side at Mound, Mississippi and caused
what proved to be the most d sastrous crevasse in river
',
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hi story.
A prodigious mass of water must be taken care of
at that point. Four and a half Niagaras can not be
abolished. They must, go somewhere and Nature has pro-
vided the path.
The Mississippi River empties by three separate
mouths into the Gulf of Mexico, extending a mud bank at
the rate of one mile for each twei ty-one years. Centuries
ago the same process was going on at what is now the
southeast corner of Arkansas. There the Mississippi
possibly discharged a portion of its waters westward,
then encroached farther south and abandoned that channel.
Whether this be true or not, an irregular basin still
exists, known as the Boeuf River Basin, the Tensas Basin,
and the Atchafalaya.
Belov/ the Red River this runs into a chain of lakes,
and the well defined Atchafalaya River, which debouches
into the Gulf, about ninety miles west of New Orleans.
This depression is continuous from the mouth of the
Arkansas and once a drop of water escapes from the Miss-
issippi it never gets back again.
Near the mouth of the Arkansas are the highest floods
and here is the natural outlet. It has always been the
natural outlet. Prior to 1921, whenever the Mississippi
River swelled beyond fifty-one feet on the Arkansas City
.vSvL
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gauge it automatically relieved the pressure by dis-
charging at this point through Cypress Creek. This
surplus went into a small stream called the Boeuf River,
which parallels the main stream at from five to fifty
miles
.
Up to seven years ago this was the routine of
every overflow
—
fifty-one feet at Arkansas City, down
the Boeuf, out by the mouth of the Atchafalaya. The
Boeuf River Basin necessarily was inundated because that
territory is part of the high water bed of the Mississippi.
All this was before 1921 when Cypress Creek was
closed by a levee which diverted the water from the
Boeuf River and added to the excessive load already carried
by the main channel. Engineers are practically unanimous
that Cypress Creek must be reopened but not as it was be-
fore. Without drawing off the surplus our levees will
surely break in times of super-flood. Crevasses will
come at unexpected points, perhaps in front of thickly
populated communities and because of higher levees, a
higher head of water, the losses must be far, far greater.
If the levees will not hold a super-flood the wraters
must get out, it then seems the part of wisdom to dis-
charge a part of them where the overflow dees the least
harm, into a. prepared basin from which those waters never
return to the Mississippi.
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To secure a timely discharge of the Mississippi
through Cypress Creek, that levee will remain at its
present height of 60.5 feet, while those that flank it
on either side are raised three feet. This is the
"Fuse Plug” levee, so named because its relatively
weaker section is supposed to blow out like a safety
valve and let off excess waters which the leveed channel
below wrill not carry. The protection now enjoyed by
lands that lie within the floodway itself is not reduced.
But no flood can overtop this fuse plug until it becomes
so high that the main channel must find an outlet. The
high water of 1927 if confined, would hcve overwhelmed
the fuse plug by 8.5 feet and gone down the Boeuf River.
There was much argument against the height of this
fuse plug, 60.5 feet as against the proposed masonry
spillway with a fixed level of 54.5, six feet below the
height of the fuse plug. It is insisted that at 60.5
feet unless the fuse plug blows out with a rush, the
Vicksburg sea wall will be endangered; 60.5 feet at
Arkansas City means 58 on the Vicksburg gauge, about a
foot below what our wall successfully withstood in 1927.
If a masonry spillway were used, over which waters
pour at 54.5, then the Boeuf River Basin must be fre-
quently submerged during seasons when it would be kept
dry by a fuse plug at 60.5.
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On the other hand, over a lower spillway the
water flows sooner, but it also stops flowing when the
river falls below 54.5. Though the fuse plug protects
the Boeuf River up to 60.5, once that plug should break
it carries down much more water, which remains for a
longer time, for the fuse plug will not cease flowing
until the Mississippi returns to its banks, somewhere
around forty-two feet.
But a monstrous wall of water will not come roll-
ing down the floodway. Crevasses never act like that.
tTAt first there is a terrific inrush, which soon strikes
the flat lands, loses velocity and spreads. Tt
Inhabitants will have plenty of time to move. Dur-
ing the flood of 1927 the United States Weather Bureau
did extremely valuable service.
On April 2, Pittsburg, Pa. was v.rarned that it would
get the flood crest about May 1, a month ahead of the
flood.
New Orleans was -warned a month ahead of the flood
crest. It was possible to warn all people all up and
down the Mississippi. Nobody need be caught. When the
river reaches the 51 foot mark at Cairo, Illinois it is
a signal to people to get ready to fight the flood. It
takes about 6 days from Cairo, Illinois for the flood to
1 Keeping the Father of Waters in the Straight and Narrow-
Path, Saturday Evening Post, November 3, 1928, p. 52
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reach 1 emphis, Tennessee, 21 days from Memphis to
the Red River, and 50 daps to reach New Orleans.
The Mississippi overflows do not occur like
mountain stream freshets, or when a huge dam bursts.
Inundations are more or less expected for months. The
riparian people know that the fuse plug will break at
60.5. Suppose that Arkansas City gauge now stands at
40, there is no cause for alarm. The next week, how-
ever, it has reached 50. The people are still safe.
The Ohio is rising, and the Missouri waters continue to
pile up, big waters are reported at Cairo. When the
barometer has reached 59 it is time for all to be ready
to move. The waters reach 60 at Arkansas City, when,
if ever, the super-flood shall reach 60.5 the fuse plug
has blown out. Thousands of telephones, telegraphs,
radios, newspapers will have given warnings for days.
Even after Cypress Creek has gone out, farmers will have,
some of them as much as two weeks to prepare for the
floods
.
New Orleans Wall
In the tangled Atch. falaya-Red section, Morgan
City, Melville and Simmesport will be inclosed wholly
or partly by levees.
New Orleans, the second seaport of the United States
.'
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must be made secure. A crevasse here would cost
human lives and many millions of property.
According to expert opinion the safety of New
Orleans can be accomplished. The first step is by
an outlet at Cypress Creek.
Next, twenty -five miles above the city, more sur-
plus water will be shifted through Bonne Carre spill-
way into Lake Pontchartrain, which communicates with
the Gulf.
The Bonne Carre outlet is designed so as to af-
ford perfect control of the discharge. "Whenever a
flood reaches twenty feet at New Orleans, these sluices
will be opened, taking off sufficient water to prevent
the crest from mounting above twenty as it passes the
1
city.
"
Past records indicate that about once in five years
it may be necessary to open the spillway. By this fre-
quency of use, the deposit of silt in Lake Pontchart-
rain may average one thirty-second of an inch per annum.
Local taxation has built magnificent levees on the
New Orleans front, so high, so wide, with such, flat
slopes that there can be no danger except from super-
floods actually ruining over them and causing the banks
to cave, or erosions from underneath.
As a further precaution the emergency spillway into
1 Keeping the Father of Waters in the Straight and Narrow
Path, Dickson, Saturday Evening Post, Nov. 3, 1928, p. 52
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Lake Borgre, et Caernarvon will be kept closed.
Caernarvon lies about eleven miles below, to draw off
excess water at that point speeds the current at Lew
Orleans and adds to the perils of caving banks.
From a point some seventy-five miles south of
New Orleans to the head of the alluvial valley, every
embankment will be strengthened beyond the possibility
of saturation. In 1927 water stood against these ridges
for 156 days. They became soaked, sobby, trembled be-
neath the tread of a man. Now, while being moderately
raised, the levees will also be thickened, so that see-
age can not trickle through.
1
"Part of the embankment must remain dryr and firm."
The man who owns land in the narrow strip of backwater
area between Cairo and Memphis, or a similar strip be-
tween Vicksburg and Baton Rouge will be injured by the
system of levees. These acres crouch at the foot of the
hills, and are insufficient in extent to justify the
cost of protection. Formerly they were overflowed every
season, but as a rule the water went off in time to pro-
duce a crop. Levees now raise the flood levels and these
lands are greats damaged.
This same hardship applies to large areas at the
mouths of the tributary rivers, the St. Francis, White,
1 Keeping the Father of Waters in the Straight and Narrow
Path, Harris Dickson, Saturday Evening Post, ovember 3,
1928, p. 56
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Yazoo, and Red. These areas are always flooded, but not
to so great a depth nor for so long a period. Many
of these plantations have been abandoned.
"The act of Congress authorizing flood control
emphasizes the fact that no liability for damage shall
rest upon the United States, yet if it be found im-
practicable at any point along the Mississippi, to con-
struct levees, and lands are subjected to overflow and
damage, which are not, now overflowed or damaged, then
the Government may acquire either absolute ownership
1
of land or floodage rights."
Again in Section 4: "The United States shall pro-
vide flowage rights for additional destructive flood
waters that will pass by reason of diversions from the
main channel of the Mississippi River: Provided, that
in all cases where the execution of the flood control
plan results in benefits to property, such benefits,
shall be taken into consideration by way of reducing
2
the amount of compensation to be paid."
A statement of the plans can give one no idea of
the magnitude of this great project. It has involved
an incredible amount of labor and study by the foremost
engineers of the world. Of the best engineers, many of
1 Keeping the Father of Voters in the Straight and Narrow
Path, Harris Dickson, Saturday Evening Post, November 3
1928, p. 56
2 Ibid
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them go into the army and only the best have been chosen
for this great task. Associated with them are dozens of
civilian engineers, especially trained by a life-time
fighting of high waters, they are able, honest men. They
have no local interests to serve, no pecuniary profit
to expect.
The acquisition of rights of way and the condemnation
of property for floodways and the spillway above New
Orleans (Bonne Carre) formed a part of the work of the
program for the year 1929-1930. The rapid execution of
the levee building and the general process in carrying out
the project have met with general approval despite strenu-
ous local protests. The completion of this program will
give the delta the protection which prior to 1927 was
thought wholly unnecessary and which according to all avail-
able data seems sufficiently adequate.
From a National view-point representing, the people
of the entire valley, we must consider the plan as a whole,
balance the unavoidable disadvantages of certain communities
against the greatest good of the greatest number and defend
the most people with the least damage to the few.
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Official Photograph, U. S. Army Air Corps
SEVENTY-LIVE YEARS AGO THIS PLAIN BELONGED TO THE INDIANS
Not until 1854 was a treaty concluded with the Omaha Indians which gave to white settlers
title to what is now the city of Omaha.
’’Trailing History Down the Big Muddy"
The National Geographic, Jury 1928--p. 10b
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Looking into the Future
The influence of the Panama Canal on American
shipping has been profound. The best of our privately
owned ships are engaged in the protected trade between
the Atlantic and the Pacific Coast. Foreign ships are
forbidden to enter into our coastal trade.
During the World War the United States Council’s
Committee on Inland Waterway Transportation recommended
full utilization of our inland waterway facilities.
The principle of joint rail and inland water rates
was established at that time. Without the arrangements for
interchange of cargo between rail and rivers, inland water-
way carriers might still be limited to cargo originating
within a few miles of the vraterway.
Much of the recently renewed interest in inland
waterways is due to President Hoover who was Secretary
of Commerce during the World War. He recommended that
"our inland water transportation activities should be
directed toward a unified and interchangeable system of
9,000 miles in the Mississippi and tributary valleys and
to a deep channel outlet from the Great Lakes to the
1
Atlantic .
”
The business men of the Middle West have been greatly
1 Recent Economic Changes-
-Vol. I p. 517
Report of President Hoover's Committee on Recent
Economic Changes
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interested in this program because of the shift of
traffic due to the opening of the Panama Canal. Those
affected by this shift of trade are seeking cheaper
transportation outlets and inlets and are eager to
support the development of the Mississippi River system
including a Great Lakes connection and the Great Lakes
to the Atlantic Waterway.
The Mississippi River inland waterway traffic has
received more attention than all other rivers. The
government is attempting to create conditions required
to stimulate private ownership on these waterways.
The following table illustrates the growth of traffic
carried by the Mississippi and Warrior River Barge Lines
1918-1927. 1
Year Mississippi Service Warrior Service
1918 23,378 10,350
1919 104,769 130,502
1920 160,702 200,017
1921 443,267 228,844
1922 599,669 260,344
1923 710,431 269,341
1924 849,503 222,345
1925 910,755 231,464
1926 1,044,649 296,929
1927 1,237,452 398,694
When the deepening of the Mississippi and its
tributaries is completed so that cargo can be carried
1 Recent Economic Changes—Vol. I p. 318
Report of President Hoover’s Committee on
Recent Economic Changes
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continuously in large modern barges over the greater
part of the 9,000 miles of inland channels, the effective-
ness of this method of transport, may be more apparent.
The government has borne the expense of the experi-
mental stages of development, but if the Inland Waterways
experiment by the government proves a success private
capital and private operation will doubtlessly enter this
field of transportation.
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